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Summary and Recommendations
INTRODUCTION
Task, Approach, and Scope of Report
Whenever Earth-originating spacecraft intrude on the atmosphere or sur-
face of other solar system bodies or return to Earth from one of these
bodies, there is a risk of contamination by foreign substances or organ-
isms. In the case of in situ exploration of other bodies, a major concern is
disruption of scientific findings by imported material. In the case of back
contamination (return to Earth of extraterrestrial material), there is concern
over the possible release into the biosphere of potentially harmful organ-
isms or substances.
Since 1967, a policy of planetary protection has been in place in order to
control contamination of planets by terrestrial microorganisms and organic
constituents during planetary missions. In the United States, the policy is
implemented by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA). It is accepted as official policy by the Committee on Space Re-
search (COSPAR) of the International Council of Scientific Unions. The
policy lays out a framework of specific planetary protection guidelines for
implementing procedures for future missions. Through COSPAR, review
and analysis of the policy have been ongoing and have resulted in periodic
revisions in light of new information obtained from planetary exploration. L2
In addition, the United States is a signatory to an international treaty that
declares in part that "States Parties to the treaty shall pursue studies of
outer space.., so as to avoid their harmful contamination and also adverse
changes in the environment of the Earth .... -3
BIOLOGICAL CONTAMINATION OF MARS
The Space Studies Board (SSB) of the National Research Council has
served as NASA's primary advisor concerning planetary protection (or
quarantine) for many years. The board, through its Committee on Planetary
Biology and Chemical Evolution, has published a number of reports and
letters concerning planetary protection (or quarantine) in response to NASA
requests. 4-_2 Most recently, NASA's planetary protection officer requested
that, prior to the 1992 COSPAR meeting, the board make recommendations
regarding planetary protection policy for upcoming Mars missions (Appen-
dix A). tn response to this request, the board formed the ad hoc Task Group
on Planetary Protection, made up of planetary scientists, biochemists, ecol-
ogists, and microbiologists who specialize in studying life in extreme envi-
ronments such as the polar regions and deep oceans and lakes (Appendix
B). The task group hosted a workshop in September 1991 at which exten-
sive briefings on planned and contemplated Mars missions and the many
aspects of Mars science and survival of Earth organisms were reviewed
and discussed in detail (Appendix C). Scientists from Europe and the
former USSR made presentations concerning their current views and ap-
proaches to planetary protection. These presentations and discussions, along
with a reassessment of the SSB's 1978 report, Recommendations on Quar-
antine Policy for Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus, Neptune, and Titan 13
(excerpted in Appendix D), form the basis for this report. Additional infor-
mation considered by the task group is given in Appendix E.
In keeping with NASA's request, the task group focused on making
recommendations concerning the protection of Mars from forward con-
tamination (i.e., contamination of the martian environment by terrestrial
organisms) during upcoming missions by both the United States and the
former Soviet Union. In so doing, it distinguished between missions whose
goals include reconnaissance and measurement and those that specifically
include experiments to detect life. The task group also discussed what
additional knowledge will be needed in order to assure that future recom-
mendations regarding contamination of Earth from Mars (back contam-
ination) might be made with a higher degree of certainty than is now
possible.
Following a short introduction to the rationale underlying planetary ex-
ploration (Chapter 1) is a brief summary of approved and contemplated
missions to Mars (Chapter 2). Chapter 3 briefly reviews the state of knowl-
edge in several areas pertinent to the problem of planetary protection, in-
cluding chemical and physical properties of Mars, and Chapter 4 discusses
the limits of life on Earth and the abilities of known terrestrial organisms
to withstand extreme environmental conditions, as well as new approaches
to detecting life forms. Chapter 5 includes a review and comments--made
in light of current knowledge--on the recommendations made in Recom-
mendations on Quarantine Policy for Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus, Nep-
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tune,andTitan. Updates to the recommendations made in 1978 are also
given in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 gives additional recommendations concerning
collection of essential data, spacecraft sterilization and bioburden assess-
ment, and future research, as well as legal and societal issues and NASA's
overall planetary protection program.
Background
Understanding the origin and evolution of life has been an important
goal of NASA; studies in this area generate some of the more interesting
scientific questions for all mankind. One promising approach to under-
standing life's origins is that of searching for life elsewhere, primarily on
other planets, where physical, hydrological, and geochemical properties
might favor (or might have favored in the past) the existence of replicating
biotic systems like those found on Earth. Historically Mars has been the
planet of choice for understanding life's Origins.
With the technological advances that accompanied the advent of space-
craft exploration, our ability to conduct detailed studies of planets in the
solar system improved dramatically. As our knowledge of present condi-
tions on the surface of Mars has increased, there has been a concomitant
decrease in any expectation that life as we know it could exist on the
surface of the planet. At the same time, it is important to remember that (I)
Viking lander sites have not been representative of the entire planet and (2)
the early state of Mars seems to have differed quite markedly from its
present state and may have been characterized by the presence of abundant
liquid water and a more substantial atmosphere. Future life-detection mis-
sions to Mars must include investigation of other more biologically rel-
evant, desirable sites where evidence of the survival of either molecular or
morphologically preserved cells or ceil Components may exist.
As in the past, it is necessary to continue to take precautions to ensure
planetary protection, both from forward and back contamination. With re-
spect to forward contamination, NASA's historic concern has been to
preserve pristine conditions on the planets for future experiments with bio-
logical and organic constituents that might lead to insights concerning the
origin and evolution of life in the cosmos. Knowledge has increased sub-
stantially since the Viking mission. Recommendations for planetary protec-
tion that guided the Viking mission may not be relevant to missions being
flown today or to those planned for the future. As more information is
acquired about a given extraterrestrial body, assessment of the amount of
planetary protection needed to protect that body from contamination should
change accordingly. The process must be iterative and must allow for alter-
ing the techniques used to ensure protection as we learn more about plan-
etary conditions and the probability of contamination.
4 BIOLOGICAL CONTAMINATION OF MARS
FUTURE MISSIONS
At this time, there are two approved missions to Mars: the U.S. Mars
Observer mission to be launched in October 1992 and the Soviet Mars 94/
96 mission. Both NASA and the European Space Agency (ESA) are study-
ing a network mission that involves placing numerous small stations on the
surface of the planet. In addition, both the United States and the former
Soviet Union have been studying various rover and sample return missions
for some time. These missions, which will gradually improve our knowl-
edge of the environmental parameters of Mars and enhance our ability to
select and protect appropriate landing sites, are discussed in detail in Chapter 2.
SURFACE ENVIRONMENT OF MARS
Despite an incomplete understanding of the surface environment of Mars,
it is generally agreed that conditions are extremely inhospitable to terres-
trial life. Various aspects of the surface environment have relevance to the
issue of forward contamination, including both growth on Mars of organ-
isms from Earth and the lifetime of bioorganic matter deposited on the
martian surface. Chapter 3 of this report reviews the state of knowledge
regarding the martian surface, including its chemistry, solar radiation flux,
temperature, water, volcanism, and past climate conditions.
LIMITS OF LIFE ON EARTH: EXPANSION OF THE
MICROBIAL WORLD AND DETECTION OF LIFE
Life in Extreme Environments
The Task Group on Planetary Protection assessed past reports and cur-
rent views on the range of environmental conditions believed to exist on
Mars and unanimously agreed that it is extremely unlikely that a terrestrial
organism could grow on the sulface of Mars. It is clear that the most
extreme environments on Earth where organisms can replicate are consider-
ably less extreme than the environments that are known to occur over most
of the martian surface. Particularly important in this regard are the high
levels of ultraviolent radiation, the thin atmosphere, the extremely low max-
imum temperatures, and the absence of liquid water on the surface.
Based on current knowledge of conditions on Earth that limit cell growth
and on the best estimates of surface conditions on Mars, the task group
concluded that no known terrestrial organisms could grow on the martian
surface. However, this does not imply that life does not exist anywhere on
the planet. There is far too little information to assess the possibility that
life may exist in subsurface environments associated with hydrothermal
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activity or in selected microenvironments free from the harsh conditions
previously mentioned, or to conclude that organisms resembling terrestrial
life forms did not evolve on Mars.
The task group concentrated on the problem of forward contamination by
intact cells or components of cells that could be detected by sophisticated
molecular methods in future expeditions designed to look for evidence of
extant or past life on Mars. Planning for present and future missions to
Mars must include awareness of new results obtained from studies of ex-
treme environments as well as the inevitable extension of the limits of
environments where growth and survival can take place. Advances in un-
derstanding the microbiology of extreme environments have been accompa-
nied by advances in the development of new methods and considerably
more accurate and sensitive instruments for detecting the presence of life
and life-related molecules and for identifying their evolutionary relatedness.
Nevertheless, it is not a straightforward matter to define the ranges of
physical and chemical conditions on Earth in which organisms can grow,
replicate, or survive for extended periods. During the 13 years since the
SSB's last report on planetary protection, Recommendations on Quarantine
Policy for Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus, Neptune, and Titan, bacteria have
been detected or isolated from many of Earth's hostile environments--the
dry, extremely cold subsurfaces and interiors of rocks in the dry valleys of
the Antarctic, hot environments associated with submarine and terrestrial
volcanoes and geothermal systems, and deep subsurface sediments and aqui-
fers. Chapter 4 includes a review of these organisms.
Life Detection and Bioburden Determination
for Planetary Protection
Techniques for assessing the existence of microorganisms have advanced
dramatically since pre-Viking days. These advances will have a strong
impact both on bioburden assessment procedures and on future life-detec-
tion experiments. New methods have been developed with increasingly
greater sensitivity and specificity. The task group strongly recommends
that efforts be made to explore current analytical methods for use in
bioburden assessment and inventory procedures before spacecraft as-
sembly and launch.
In addition to epifluorescent microscopic techniques for directly count-
ing viable cells, many other new methods have been developed, such as the
polymerase chain reaction, allowing greatly increased sensitivity of detec-
tion by enzymatically amplifying specific biomarkers of even a single cell
to detectable levels. The appeal of these techniques is their extreme sensi-
tivity. In many cases, single cells can be detected and identified with
confidence.
6 BIOLOGICAL CONTAMINATION OF MARS
ASSESSMENT OF THE 1978 REPORT
Review
Recommendations on Quarantine Policy for Mat's, Jupiter, Saturn, Ura-
nus, Neptune, and Titan, the 1978 report by the then Space Science Board's
Committee on Planetary Biology and Chemical Evolution, established a
quarantine policy for exploratory, one-way missions to Mars, Jupiter, Sat-
urn, Uranus, Neptune, and Titan planned for 1974 to 1994. The task group's
assessment of this report is limited to an evaluation of information and past
recommendations concerning Mars. After the 1978 report was issued, NASA
began to look for ways to simplify planetary protection procedures as they
applied to particular upcoming planetary missions, and to minimize the use
of mathematical models.
Prior to the 1978 report, the criteria used for determining categories of
planetary contamination were those established by international agreement
through COSPAR. They stipulated that the probability of contamination
(P,) should be less than 1 × 10 3 for each planet. Considerable uncertainty
was engendered by this probabilistic approach to planetary protection. Concern
related to this point has been expressed over the years by virtually every
group that has analyzed the problem, and indeed by NASA. Although the
probability of depositing a microbe or some organic material indicative of
life is very high (microbes and organic contaminants have almost certainly
been deposited by past missions), our expectations regarding the likelihood
of permanent contamination as a result of microbial growth (expressed as
the probability of growth, Pg) have been steadily reduced as we have learned
more about Mars.
The NASA studies that followed the 1978 report culminated in a 1984
report to COSPAR that greatly deemphasized the probabilistic approach and
introduced the concept of target planet and mission-type categories. 14 This
approach, which is reviewed in Chapter 5, directly reflects the degree of
concern for a given planet, in the context of a particular type of mission.
Recommendations of the Task Group
The task group views the problem of forward contamination as separable
into two principal issues: (1) the potential for growth of terrestrial organ-
isms on Mars and (2) the importation of terrestrial organic contaminants,
living or dead, in amounts sufficient to compromise the search for evidence
of past or present life on Mars itself.
The guidelines concerning probabilities of growth (Ps) issued by the
Space Science Board in its 1978 report were recently reassessed in a 1991
NASA report. 15 Comments and estimates made by the participants illus-
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trate a consensus that the Pg values for terrestrial organisms on Mars are
probably lower than the 1978 estimates. However, this observation does
not alter the case as far as contamination of a possible past or extant mar-
tian biosphere is concerned. Prudence dictates that bioload reduction on all
lander missions to Mars must continue to be seriously addressed. The issue
of spacecraft cleanliness is particularly crucial when life-detection experi-
ments are included in the scientific payload.
The deliberations of the task group were greatly aided by the MESUR
mission workshop that resulted in the above-mentioned 1991 report. That
report, together with the comprehensive briefings given by experts on rel-
evant matters, led the task group to concur unanimously with the following
conclusion from the MESUR workshop:
Forward contamination, solely defined as contamination of the martian
environment by growth of terrestrial organisms that have potential for growth
on Mars, is not a significant hazard. However, forward contamination
more broad]y defined to include contamination by terrestrial organic mat-
ter associated with intact cells or cell components is a significant threat to
interpretation of results of in situ experiments specifically designed to
search for evidence of extant or fossil martian microorganisms.
Based on the MESUR group's consensus and the task group's agreement
with it, the task group makes the following recommendations for control of
forward contamination, each tied to specific mission objectives.
• Landers carrying instrumentation for in situ investigation of ex-
tant martian life should be subject to at least Viking-level sterilization
procedures. Specific methods for sterilization are to be determined. Vi-
king technology may be adequate, but requirements will undoubtedly be
driven by the nature and sensitivity of the particular experiments. The
objective of this requirement is the reduction, to the greatest feasible extent,
of contamination by terrestrial organic matter and/or microorganisms de-
posited at the landing site.
• Spacecraft (including orbiters) without biological experiments should
be subject to at least Viking-level presterilization proceduresmsuch as
clean-room assembly and cleaning of all components--for bioload re-
duction, but such spacecraft need not be sterilized. Table 1.1 in Chapter
1 summarizes Viking-level procedures, and Appendix E includes a detailed
description of the procedures.
The task group sees little utility in further attempts to estimate actual
probability-of-contamination values in various martian environmental re-
gimes. In the absence of crucial data relating to the survivability and
growth potential of terrestrial organisms on Mars, such exercises are purely
subjective. The task group emphasizes that the philosophical intent under-
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lying the 1978 report--to protect Mars from terrestrial contamination so as
not to jeopardize future experiments aimed at detecting martian life--is still
profoundly important.
ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendations for Research
The task group strongly recommends that a sequence of unpiloted
missions to Mars be undertaken well in advance of a piloted mission.
Any future changes in recommendations to ensure planetary protection, es-
pecially for piloted or sample return missions, will depend on the acquisi-
tion of new data. With regard to these missions, the task group recom-
mends that a broad spectrum of martian sites be examined, with emphasis
on measurements that provide data most likely to contribute to models
that provide for a better understanding of the probability of life on
Mars and where best to go to find it.
Until such data are available, it will be impossible to make informed
decisions concerning landings for in-depth biological study. Such data will
also greatly affect the ability to make future decisions concerning the rigor
required for spacecraft cleanliness and possible sterilization.
Location of martian lander sites should take into account our rudimen-
tary but growing understanding of Mars and our extensive knowledge of the
basic requirements of life. It is also important to consider the subsurface of
Mars. Within a site, it may prove important to plan for data collection that
probes below the readily accessible surface, in order to obtain information
on subsurface environments. Microenvironments--whether on the surface
or in isolated vents, cracks, or layers of the subsurface--may exist now or
may once have existed at some time in the past. Properly designed experi-
ments may be able to address the issue of spatial and (perhaps) temporal
heterogeneity and its possible relationship to our ability to evaluate the
biotic and abiotic status of a given site.
Collection of appropriate data should allow the scientific community to
amend planetary protection policy recommendations for back contamina-
tion, perhaps resulting in recommendations similar to the alterations in pro-
cedures for assessing forward contamination suggested by this task group.
The determination of current or inferred past geophysical conditions on Mars
may help identify locations where life-detection missions should be sent.
Recommendations Regarding Assessment of Spacecraft Bioload
The task group's recommendation to reduce bioload on all spacecraft and
to sterilize those spacecraft used in life-detection missions assumes the use
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of Viking procedures. However, the task group recommends that the
Viking protocols for assessment of spacecraft bioloads be upgraded to
include state-of-the-art methods for the determination of bioload. It is
critical that methods for assessing bioload be compatible with methods used
to detect life, with methods for both assessment and detection reflecting the
same limits and sensitivity. Data on bioloads of Viking components and
spacecraft are not relevant to current life-detection procedures. Modern
methods of bioburden assessment should be developed for and applied to
spacecraft destined for future Mars missions, especially those carrying in
situ extant life-detection experiments. Although immediate use of these
techniques is not a feasible goal, the development of the methodology in
anticipation of future life-detection missions is absolutely essential.
Recommendations Concerning Other Issues
Piloted Versus Unpiloted Missions
Missions carrying humans to Mars will contaminate the planet. It is
therefore critical that every attempt be made to obtain evidence of past and/
or present life on Mars well before these missions occur. The issues of
forward and back contamination have societal, legal, and international im-
plications. These implications are serious, and they deserve discussion and
attention.
Societal Issues
A substantial number of active national and international organizations
are on the alert for environmental abuse. There is every reason to take
seriously the concern (already expressed in some cases) about contamina-
tion of Mars and almost certainly about the issue of back contamination of
Earth by martian samples. Although public concern over such issues is
often sincere and productive, it at times becomes distorted and exaggerated
in the media, leading to public misunderstanding and opposition. The task
group recommends that NASA inform the public about current plan-
etary protection plans and provide continuing updates concerning Mars
exploration and sample return.
Legal Issues
There are also legal issues that must be addressed, involving interna-
tional restrictions as well as federal, state, and local statutes that may come
into play. There are currently no binding international agreements concern-
ing forward or back contamination. The task group recommends as es-
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sential that efforts be made (1) to assess the legal limits (and implied
liabilities) in existing legislation that relates to martian exploration and
(2) to pursue the establishment of international standards that will safe-
guard the scientific integrity of research on Mars. Furthermore, the
task group recommends that NASA make a strong effort to obtain in-
ternational agreement for a planetary protection policy.
NASA Planetary Protection Program
Although a planetary protection officer currently exists at NASA, there
is no budgeted program (as there was during the Viking Program) to imple-
ment needed planetary protection research, a public education program, ex-
amination of legal and international issues, and the like. The task group
recommends that NASA redefine the responsibilities and authority of
its planetary protection officer and provide sufficient resources to carry
out the recommendations made in this report.
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
All of the recommendations put forward by the task group in this report
are summarized below. Each is discussed further in the full report in the
chapter(s) indicated.
I. Efforts should be made to adopt current molecular analytical methods
for use in bioburden assessment and inventory procedures for spacecraft
assembly and launch for future missions, and also to develop new methods
for the same purposes (Chapters 4 and 5).
2. Landers carrying instrumentation for in situ investigation of extant
martian life should be subject to at least Viking-level sterilization proce-
dures. Specific methods for sterilization are to be determined; Viking tech-
nology may be adequate, but requirements will undoubtedly be driven by
the nature and sensitivity of the particular experiments. The rationale for
this requirement is the reduction, to the greatest feasible extent, of contami-
nation by terrestrial organic matter that is deposited at the site by microor-
ganisms or organic residues carried on the spacecraft (Chapter 5).
3. Spacecraft (including orbiters) without biological experiments should
be subject to at least Viking-level presteritization procedures--such as clean-
room assembly and cleaning of all components--for bioload reduction, but
such spacecraft need not be sterilized (Chapter 5).
4. A sequence of unpiloted missions to Mars should be undertaken well
in advance of a piloted mission (Chapter 6).
5. A broad spectrum of martian sites should be examined with emphasis
on measurements that provide data most likely to contribute to a better
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understanding of the probability of life on Mars and where best to go to be
able to detect it (Chapter 6).
6. The Viking protocols for assessment of spacecraft bioloads should
be upgraded to include state-of-the-art methods for the determination of
bioload (Chapter 6).
7. NASA should inform the public about current planetary protection
plans and provide continuing updates concerning Mars exploration and sample
return (Chapter 6).
8. It is essential to assess the legal limits (and implied liabilities) in
existing legislation that relates to martian exploration and to pursue the
establishment of international standards that will safeguard the scientific
integrity of research on Mars (Chapter 6).
9. NASA should make a strong effort to obtain international agreement
for a planetary protection policy (Chapter 6).
10. NASA should redefine the responsibilities and authority of its plan-
etary protection officer and provide sufficient resources to carry out the
above recommendations (Chapter 6).
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1Introduction
Understanding the origin and evolution of life has been an important
goal of NASA and continues to generate some of the more interesting scien-
tific questions for all mankind: Where did we come from? When did life
begin? Does life exist elsewhere? If it exists elsewhere, is life similar to
that found on Earth? Although there are many theories regarding these
issues, there are as yet no definitive answers.
One promising approach to understanding the origin and evolution of life
is to search for life elsewhere, primarily on other planets, where physical,
hydrological, and geochemical properties might favor (or might have fa-
vored in the past) the existence of replicating biotic systems like those
found on Earth. If life or evidence of it is found elsewhere, then our views
of the evolution of life on Earth may change drastically, and our under-
standing of life processes and the cosmos will be enhanced dramatically.
Although the search for life and/or the chemical precursors of life can be
justified in many places in the cosmos, some areas appear more likely than
others to yield positive results. As articulated in The Search for Life's
Origins, a 1990 report of the Committee on Planetary Biology and Chemi-
cal Evolution of the National Research Council, l "Mars continues to be the
extraterrestrial body that holds greatest promise of scientific return on fun-
damental questions about the origin of life" (p. 71). While the committee
agreed that present evidence indicates that extant life on the surface of Mars
is not likely, it also stated that "there are reasonable prospects that evidence
of chemical evolution and fossil life might be found" (p. 71). Because of
these possibilities, the committee recommended that a major objective of
future research be "[t]o assess the isotopic, molecular, morphological, and
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environmental evidence for chemical evolution and the origin of life on
Mars" (p. 71).
Mars has been the object of intense scientific scrutiny since the invention
of the telescope. It has also been the object of intense speculation concern-
ing the possible presence of life on that planet, a possibility that has often
enjoyed considerable popular appeal. With the technological advances that
accompanied the development of spacecraft, our ability to conduct detailed
studies of the planets in the solar system improved dramatically.
However, as our knowledge of conditions on the surface of Mars has
increased, there has been a concomitant decrease in any expectation that life
as we know it could exist on the planet. The Mariner spacecraft, which
made both flyby and orbiter measurements, and later the Viking orbiters
and landers, provided much new information about thc chemical and physical
nature of Mars. Viking attempted to look directly for life and for organic
molecules commonly associated with life at two landing sites on the sur-
face. No organic matter was found, and most scientists agree that no indi-
cations of life were detected. Granting these observations, it is also quite
clear, however, that (1) the Viking experiments were performed at only two
sites, which may not have been representative of the whole planet, and (2)
the early state of Mars seems to have been very different from its present
state and may have been characterized by the presence of abundant liquid
water and a more substantial atmosphere. 24 Given these considerations, the
search for life on Mars must include examination of other, more desirable
sites (e.g., those where water has been present in the past) where life or a
fossil (organismal and/or chemical) record may possibly exist.
The possibility that evidence of chemical evolution and/or fossil life
might be found on Mars has led many scientists to embrace the conclusion,
expressed in The Search for Life's Origins, that continued chemical, physi-
cal, environmental, and biological study of Mars is a scientifically sound
enterprise. It is thus not surprising that scientists from many different na-
tions are planning to participate in missions to Mars to investigate its prop-
erties by using a variety of different approaches, including remote sensing,
use of surface landers, sample return, and eventually piloted exploration.
Some of these missions are planned to occur within the next few years,
including missions that involve landing experimental modules and penetra-
tors on the martian surface.
Assuming that Mars will be further investigated, it is imperative that
precautions be taken to ensure planetary protection, including protection
from both forward and back contamination. The problem of forward con-
tamination includes (I) the invasion of martian ecosystems by organisms
from Earth that would be capable of growing and prospering, and (2) con-
tamination by terrestrial biological material that would then be measured by
our life-detection experiments. The latter is of great concern as it would
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compromise a major part of the scientific rationale for the biological study
of Mars.
The problem of back contamination concerns the possible return of po-
tentially harmful biota to Earth. This issue is driven by many factors--
societal, political, legal, ethical, and others--in addition to purely scientific
concerns. Back contamination must be given the most serious and careful
consideration in missions where samples are to be returned to Earth for
analysis, and in piloted missions. To a large extent, the amounts and types
of measures needed for protection against back contamination will be estab-
lished on the basis of data gathered from upcoming missions now in their
planning stages. That is, if it is established that life does not exist and has
not existed on Mars, then the need for protection of Earth-bound samples
will be obviated. On the other hand, if there is a suspicion of extant or past
life, then the need for protection will have to be adjusted accordingly.
Historically, NASA's interpretation of planetary protection and its imple-
mentation of related procedures have focused on specific concerns related
to forward and back contamination. First, in the face of possible forward
contamination, the concern has been to preserve conditions on the planets
for the future conduct of experiments on biological and organic constituents
that might lead to insights concerning the origin and evolution of life in the
cosmos. Despite other issues such as the dispersal and survival of species,
the major focus has been on preserving other planetary environments from
contamination by organisms from Earth that might grow there and thus
obscure forever any efforts to understand the origin and evolution of life at
locations other than Earth. Central to this issue is an assessment of the
probability that an earthbound organism could contaminate another plan-
etary body. Contamination in this case includes not only delivery of viable
organisms, but also the growth of such organisms on the planet to such an
extent that they would compromise future scientific endeavors.
The ability to estimate the probability of contamination (P,) depends on
two factors: (I) accurate knowledge of the limits of organisms' ability to
survive and grow on Earth and (2) accurate knowledge of the surface condi-
tions of the planet to be visited. Any constraints imposed on a mission to
ensure planetary protection from forward contamination will be mission
dependent, relying on the best possible information about the conditions
that might support growth of any biota from Earth that will survive transit
through space. These points are extremely important; as information accu-
mulates about a given extraterrestrial body, assessment of the amount of
planetary protection needed to prevent contamination will undoubtedly change
accordingly. The process must be iterative and must allow for modifying
the techniques to ensure protection as new information is acquired regard-
ing the harshness of the planet and the probability of contamination.
It should be obvious that if life is to be detected on Mars (a possibility,
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TABLE 1.1
Mission Type and Objective
1. Landers with in situ extant
life-detection experiments
Viking-Level Procedures Recommended for Future Mars Missions
Procedure
Trajectory biasing and orbit lifetime
Cleaning of components"
Clean-room assembly
Surface cleaning
Lander sterilization
Protection from recontamination
Bioburden assessment
2. Orbiters and landers without Trajectory biasing and orbit lifetime
in situ extant life-detection Cleaning of components"
experiments Clean-room assembly
Surface cleaning
Bioburden assessment
_Levels and types of cleaning will depend on the particular measurements being performed
during the mission. For example, the Viking landing craft were cleaned to remove organics to
less than 1 ng cm -2 because they were measuring organic molecules. This removal of organic
material was accomplished via detergent cleaning, solvent cleaning, and hot helium purges to
remove solvents. 5 Similar levels of cleaning should be sought in future extant life-detection
studies, but these will undoubtedly be modified upwards in landers that have no in situ extant
life-detection experiments.
given the remarkable sensitivity of modern techniques and approaches),
great care must be taken not to compromise such scientific goals by a
previous or simultaneous introduction of life forms from Earth. Rigorous
precautions were taken during the Viking mission to ensure that no forward
contamination occurred. However, substantial amounts of data have accu-
mulated since that time. Thus it is quite possible that the recommendations
for planetary protection that guided the Viking mission may not be suitable
for missions being flown today or for those flown in the future. An outline
of Viking sterilization procedures is shown in Table 1.1, and a more de-
tailed explanation is included in Appendix E of this report.
The second focus of NASA's planetary protection effort has been, and
will continue to be, protection of Earth's biosphere from the possibility of
back contamination by any forms of life that may exist on other planets or
bodies that might be visited. Both in missions where samples are to be
returned to Earth for analysis and in piloted missions returning both samples
and crew, a variety of scientific, societal, and legal reasons exist for a
planetary protection policy that ensures (1) the integrity and safety of our
planet and (2) the rigorous protection of the scientific integrity of the samples.
The two goals should be accomplished with a common protocol.
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2Summary of Planned Future Missions
The following is a brief summary of upcoming or planned missions to
Mars. The only approved missions are the U.S. Mars Observer mission to
be launched in October 1992 and the Soviet Mars 1994/96 mission. Both
NASA and ESA are studying a network mission that involves placing nu-
merous small stations on the surface of the planet. In addition, both the
United States and the former Soviets have been studying various sample
return missions that may also involve the use of rovers.
APPROVED MISSIONS
U.S. Mars Observer Mission
Mars Observer will arrive at the planet in September 1993. After a
checkout period, the spacecraft will be placed in a high-inclination mapping
orbit and will start to systematically observe the planet. 1 The mapping orbit
is such that the spacecraft will have less than 1 chance in 104 of impacting
the planet before 2038. The spacecraft will have a variety of instruments
directed at characterizing both the surface and the atmosphere. An altim-
eter will determine surface elevations to a vertical precision of a few meters,
and the surface will be imaged at a resolution of roughly 100 meters per
pixel. A magnetometer will determine if the planet has an intrinsic mag-
netic field, map any crustal remnant field, and follow variations in the
magnetic field induced by the solar wind or surface anomalies. The surface
chemistry and mineralogy will be mapped by two instruments: (1) a gamma-
ray spectrometer will determine aI1 major elements and most minor ele-
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ments with spatial resolution of roughly 300 kilometers per pixel, while (2)
a thermal emission spectrometer will map variations in surface mineralogy
at a spatial resolution of roughly 3 kilometers per pixel. An on-board
camera will be used to assess daily variations in cloud patterns, as well as
to image small areas of the surface at a resolution of 1.5 meters per pixel.
A pressure modulated infrared radiometer will repeatedly sound the atmo-
sphere to characterize changes in the vertical structure of the atmosphere
with time and location. Finally, on-board transponders will permit extreme-
ly precise determination of the planet's gravitational field. The nominal
mission will last for 1 Mars year, or roughly 2 Earth years. The spacecraft
has a relay antenna designed to receive data from Soviet surface stations
to be launched in 1994 and 1996; after completion of the nominal mission,
the spacecraft will be used in part to support these surface stations. It is
also expected to continue to make observations of the planet, perhaps
focusing on areas of special interest identified during the nominal mission.
Soviet Mars 94/96 Mission
The former Soviets are planning to launch a spacecraft to Mars in 1994. 2
It will be primarily an orbiter instrumented to make a variety of observa-
tions of the surface, atmosphere, and ionosphere. Among these instruments,
those of greatest biological interest are an imaging system that will image
large regions of the planet at a resolution of 10 meters per pixel, a near-
infrared imaging spectrometer for determination of surface mineralogy, and
ground-penetrating radar that could detect anomalies caused by the pres-
ence of water near the surface. Of concern from the point of view of
planetary protection are stations that will land on the surface. The space-
craft will carry two penetrators designed to be released from the spacecraft
3 to 4 days before arrival at Mars. The penetrators will separate on impact
with the ground. The forebody will penetrate the ground to a depth on the
order of meters, while the aft body will remain resting on the surface still
wired to the forebody. Within the forebody will be various analytical in-
struments such as a gamma-ray spectrometer and a seismometer. The aft
body will have an array of meteorological instruments, a camera, and a
transmitter. The parent spacecraft will also release two small stations 3 to 4
days before arrival at Mars. These stations will land on the surface and
deploy an array of instruments similar to those in the penetrators. Both the
penetrators and the small stations are planned to last for 1 Mars year. The
landing sites are restricted to latitudes from about 20°S to 60°N.
In 1996, the former Soviets plan to launch a second spacecraft similar to
that launched in 1994, except that it wiltplace in Mars orbit a module from
which will be launched a balloon and small rover. 3 Both the balloon and
the rover will be released to the surface simultaneously and are expected to
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land in the same part of the planet. The preferred landing sites are at high
latitudes (50 to 60°N) for reasons of balloon safety. The balloon will be 30
meters high, constructed of 6-micron mylar, and designed to land at night
and float during the day. It is expected to last for as long as 10 days, during
which it could travel as far as 1000 kilometers. During the night it will
drag an instrumented guide rope along the ground. The gondola of the
balloon will carry a camera and various instruments to measure the chemis-
try and mineralogy of the soil, as well as any water present, and to monitor
the atmosphere and magnetic field. One concern is that it will be difficult
to reduce the bioload because of the balloon's fragility and size, and there
is no information available on what decontamination procedures will be
used. Since the balloon will move large distances dragging a guide rope
and instruments along the ground, the potential for contamination is
significant.
The Mars 96 rover will weigh roughly 100 kilograms and be about a
meter in height. 4 In addition to imaging instruments, it will carry instru_
ments to measure soil mineralogy and chemistry, the water content of the
soil, and trace gases in the atmosphere, and it may include capabilities for
analyzing organic materials. It will have a drill that can bring to the sur-
face, for analysis, material from a depth of as much as 2 meters below the
surface. The lifetime is nominally I Mars year. The distance that it can
travel in this time will depend on the terrain it encounters, but could be as
much as several hundred kilometers.
CONTEMPLATED MISSIONS
U.S. MESUR Mission
The United States has been studying the feasibility of placing a network
of simultaneously operating stations on the martian surface. 5 The objec-
tives of the network are (1) to determine the chemistry and mineralogy of
martian soils and rocks at different locations representative of martian het-
erogeneity, (2) to observe the fine-scale structure of the surface in different
geologic environments, (3) to determine the seismicity and internal struc-
ture of the planet, and (4) to improve our understanding of the circulation of
the atmosphere and the structure of the boundary layer. The network will
be built by launching four to eight small (1.3-meter diameter), relatively
inexpensive spacecraft on successive launch opportunities spanning a 4-
year period, possibly starting in the late 1990s. The plan is that 16 stations
will be operating simultaneously on the surface at the end of the launch
period and that they will survive for 1 full Mars year after all are in place.
The MESUR mission will thus have a total lifetime of about 7 Earth years.
The stations will fly independently to Mars and will have the ability to land
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almost anywhere on the planet. Each will carry a seismometer, a camera,
instruments for determination of the chemistry and mineralogy of rocks and
soil, and a meteorology package. The mode of instrument deployment and
whether the subsurface can be accessed are aspects still being studied. The
stations will be widely distributed, and some will be sent to places such as
the poles that are unlikely to be visited by other types of landers in the
foreseeable future.
ESA Marsnet Mission
The European Space Agency has been independently studying a network
mission called Marsnet. 6 The design is very similar to that of the MESUR
mission except that fewer stations are involved, and the mechanism for
delivery of the stations to the martian surface is uncertain. The array of
instruments proposed for Marsnet is similar to that proposed for MESUR.
Preliminary discussions have been undertaken to determine how the two
concepts might be merged.
Sample Return and Rover Missions
The return of samples from Mars has had high scientific priority but has
been deferred in favor of other missions because of its high cost. A U.S.
sample return mission before 2000 is extremely unlikely, but the former
Soviets have at times suggested that they would like to launch such a mis-
sion by that year. There are many ways to implement a sample return
mission. In the late 1980s, several types of sample return missions were
studied. They involved the return of 5 to 10 kilograms of sample and the
use of large (1000-kilogram) rovers to collect and document samples from
many different locations. Such missions would be so expensive that con-
ducting them would require major changes in the way planetary science is
funded.
More recently, simpler sample return techniques have been studied. 7 These
techniques take advantage of the miniaturization of spacecraft components
and analytical instruments, as well as the reduced amount of sample that is
required by modern analytical techniques. The general philosophy is to
send small sample return missions to several locations to obtain a variety of
samples, rather than relying on an elaborate rover to provide a range of
samples. The missions could still carry rovers to acquire samples, but the
rovers might weigh on the order of 10 kilograms rather than 1000 kilo-
grams. These approaches reduce the projected cost of sample return mis-
sions by a factor of 10. Which, if any, of these missions will actually fly is
uncertain in light of the current worldwide economic situation.
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3Surface Environment of Mars
Despite an incomplete understanding of the Mars surface environment, it
is generally agreed that conditions are extremely inhospitable to life from
Earth. This chapter reviews various aspects of the surface environment,
focusing on several that may have relevance to the issue of forward con-
tamination, including both the growth of organisms from Earth on Mars and
the lifetime of bioorganic matter deposited on the martian surface.
SURFACE CHEMISTRY
Our understanding of the chemistry and mineralogy of the martian sur-
face is incomplete and is based primarily on (1) the Viking lander experi-
ments; (2) evidence from the shergottite, nakhlite, and chassignite (SNC)
meteorites; and (3) remote sensing data. t4 Results from the gas chromato-
graph-mass spectrometer (GC-MS) have indicated the presence of 0.1 to 1.0
percent bound water in the soil. The Viking lander inorganic experiment
detected most major elements heavier than magnesium and a number of
minor elements. Several chemical species of biologic significance (C, N,
H20, P) were left undetermined and had to be inferred. Several analyses
were obtained at each of two sites, and the remarkable similarity in compo-
sition of all the materials suggested that the material had been homogenized
over the whole planet by repeated dust storms. Viking carried no mineral-
ogy experiment, and so mineralogy had to be inferred. Two competing
models for the mineralogy of the soil are that it (1) consists largely of iron-
rich clays or (2) resembles an amorphous, partly hydrated volcanic ash
called palagonite. Although faint traces of secondary minerals, such as
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carbonates, have been detected by spectroscopic analyses, the general lack
of absorption features suggests that the soil is poorly crystalline.
Part of our current understanding of Mars comes from the analyses of the
SNC meteorites, 5'6 which are composed of basalts that have crystallized
from melts within the past 1.3 billion years. These meteorites were origi-
nally suspected to be of martian origin because there was no other plausible
parent body that could have erupted basalts so recently. A martian origin
appears to have been confirmed from analyses of gases trapped within the
meteorites. The isotopic ratios of nitrogen, argon, and xenon are identical,
within analytical error, to the ratios found in the martian atmosphere, as
determined by Viking, and are distinctively different from those of any
other known source in the solar system, including Earth. The SNC meteor-
ites contain a variety of secondary minerals such as illite and smectite clays
and water-precipitated salts such as calcium and magnesium carbonate, cal-
cium sulfate, magnesium phosphate, and hematite (Table 3.1). Migration of
these water soluble salts within the soil is suggested by the presence of
cemented soil at the Viking sites. The chemistry of the soil as determined
at the Viking sites is consistent with the mixture of the minerals found in
the SNC meteorites, possibly with the addition of palagonite. Because of
the mafic nature of the soil, and the basaltic composition of the SNC mete-
orites, the dominant rocks exposed at the surface are thought to be basaltic.
TABLE 3.1 Mars Biogeochemistry from SNC Meteorites
Water-Precipitated Shergottite
Minerals Confirmed EETA79001 Nakhla Chassigny
CaCO3 X X
Mg-bearing CaCO 3 X
MgCO 3
(Fe,Mn)CO 3 X
CaSO4.nH20 X X
(Mg)_(po4)y.nH20 X
(Mg)_(SO4)y.nH20 X
(Na,K)CI X
"lllite" X
(K,Na,Cao.5,H30)(A1,Mg,Fe) 2
Ot0[(OH)2,H20]
S,CI-bearing micabole X
Smectite X
(Na,Cao.5)o.3(AI,Mg,Fe)2_ 3
(Si,Al)4Oi0(OH)2-nH20
Fe2OynH20 X
SOURCE: James L. Gooding, Johnson Space Center, NASA.
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The chemistry of the soil is of particular biologic interest. One of the
major surprises of the Viking missions was the failure of the GC-MS to
detect organics in samples to depths of about 10 centimeters, despite the
expectation of finding at least some organics of meteoritic origin. The soils
were also found to be oxidizing: 70 to 800 nanomoles of 02 were released
upon humidification of the soil, and nutrients added to the soil were oxi-
dized. Although the exact nature of the oxidants is unknown, they probably
form as a result of (1) condensation on the surface of OH, HO 2, and super-
oxides formed by ultraviolet (UV)-induced photolysis of water in the atmo-
sphere and/or (2) UV-induced photolysis of water absorbed on soil par-
ticles. 7 The depth to which the soil is oxidizing and is devoid of organics is
not known, but much of the loose material near the surface is likely to be
episodically turned over, exposed to the surface, and blown around the
planet as a result of wind action. The expectation is, therefore, that the
Viking results are applicable, in general, to loose, wind-deposited materials
at the surface.
ULTRAVIOLET AND IONIZING RADIATION
Although on Mars no radiation with a wavelength of less than 1900
angstroms (A) reaches the surface because of strong adsorption by CO 2, in
comparison to Earth the martian surface is only minimally shielded from
longer-wavelength UV radiation. 8 On Earth a deep ozone absorption band
at 2550 ,_ prevents most UV from reaching the surface. In contrast, ozone
is present only at high latitudes in the martian winter hemisphere and in
amounts typically in the range of 30 to 60 micrometer-atmospheres, an
amount much smaller than that shielding Earth. These amounts of ozone on
Mars can attenuate the UV to 10 -3 as compared with 10 -30 for Earth. At
low latitudes and during the summer at high latitudes, there is essentially no
attenuation, and the full solar flux at wavelengths greater than 1900 A falls
on the martian surface unless attenuated by aerosols in the atmosphere.
Significant reduction by scattering is expected only in the dust storm sea-
son, which lasts roughly one-quarter of the year. Thus, during the entire
martian year, the UV flux is sufficient to sterilize the surface environment.
Mars is less protected than Earth from ionizing radiation because Mars
has no magnetic field and only a thin atmosphere. The main concern is
with galactic cosmic rays (GCRs) and occasional solar flare particle fluxes.
GCR heavy ions, although significantly less abundant than GCR protons,
contribute most of the annual biological dose-equivalent of GCRs at the
martian surface. Doses from secondary radiation also accrue within the
upper 50 centimeters of the regolith. At low elevations, where the atmo-
sphere provides maximum protection, the GCR doses approach annual lim-
its allowed for humans but fall far short of values commonly certified for
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sterilization of food. Ionizing radiation does not appear, therefore, to be
sterilizing for the short term, although the effects of such exposures over
many years are unclear.
TEMPERATURE
Temperatures are of particular biological interest because of their influ-
ence on the stability of water. Surface temperatures are determined mainly
by latitude and season and by the properties of the surface, especially ther-
mal inertia and albedo. 9 Mean daily temperatures range from 215 K at the
equator to 150 K at the poles. Daily excursions from the mean are con-
trolled largely by the thermal inertia of the soil. Martian soils have very
low thermal inertias compared with those of typical terrestrial soils, which,
together with the thin atmosphere, cause the near surface to heat rapidly
during the day and cool rapidly at night. As a result, equatorial tempera-
tures can range from as low as 180 K at night to 290 K at noon. However,
these daily fluctuations damp out rapidly at depth, such that at a few centi-
meters depth the temperatures remain close to the diurnal mean of 215 K.
Temperatures at the poles remain close to 150 K, the condensation tempera-
ture of CO 2, for most of the year. For a short period in midsummer, CO 2
completely sublimes at the north pole, exposing a water-ice cap and allow-
ing the surface temperature to rise to 200 to 210 K on the water-ice and
possibly to 230 K on dark ground. At the south pole, only incomplete
sublimation of the CO 2 was observed during the year that Viking viewed
Mars; even then, however, within the seasonal cap some ground was ex-
posed, which rose to higher temperatures. Because the CO 2 cap disappears
for only a short period of time, the mean annual temperature at both poles is
close to 150 K, and at depths greater than 1 to 2 meters, the ground remains
permanently at this temperature. Any summer increase in ground tempera-
ture is restricted to shallower depths.
WATER
Estimates of the amount of water present at the martian surface have
ranged widely in recent years, l°13 However, recent recognition of the effi-
cacy of gas-dynamic escape and impact erosion in removing volatiles from
the planet early in its history has undermined geochemical arguments for
low water abundances and has led to greater credence of the higher geologic
estimates based on the observed effects of water on the surface. Recent
estimates suggest that if all the water that flowed across the surface during
the last 3.8 billion years were spread evenly over the planet, it would form a
layer tens to hundreds of meters deep. For comparison, all the water present
at the surface of Earth would form a layer 2.7 kilometers deep. The total
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crustal inventory of water on Mars is difficult to assess, but it could be
considerably larger than that which flowed across the surface. Identifiable
near-surface reservoirs are the residual north polar ice cap, the polar layered
terrains, and water absorbed in the regolith minerals. All these reservoirs
are probably small in comparison to the total inventory. Most of the water
is thought to occur as ground ice and, at depths greater than 1 kilometer, as
ground water. The atmosphere contains very little water (10 -3 M), but it is
close to saturation for nighttime conditions.
For the average amount of water present in the atmosphere of 10 precipi-
table microns of water, the frost-point temperature is 200 K (corresponding
to a vapor pressure of water of 0.1 pascal). Any part of the near surface of
the planet where the temperature exceeds 200 K should be ice-free because
of the slow sublimation of the ice over geologic time. At low latitudes,
where mean annual temperatures exceed 200 K, the ground is generally
expected to be ice-free to depths of a few hundred meters. However, anomalous
combinations of albedo, thermal inertia, and porosity could result in near-
surface ice locally.
At latitudes in excess of 30 to 40 °, ice may be present at depths greater
than 1 to 2 meters, the depth of penetration of the annual wave, because
mean annual temperatures are below 200 K. At shallow depths small amounts
of ice could be present only transiently as water vapor moves in and out of
the soil in response to the seasonal temperature cycle. Although there are
no direct measurements of ground ice at these high latitudes, there is abun-
dant geologic evidence that, in contrast to low latitudes, ice is indeed present.
The stability conditions just described are equilibrium conditions, and
various events could result in the presence of ice in disequilibrium. If ice
were buried beneath a few centimeters in equatorial soil, sublimation rates
would be very low (about 10-5 gm cm -2 yr-_). If water were supplied at a
rate greater than this, such as by volcanic action, then ice could accumulate
near the surface, despite being in disequilibrium with the atmosphere.
VOLCANISM
Volcanism is of biologic interest because of the possibility of hydrother-
mal activity and because of its potential effects on the distribution of water.
Evidence from both counts of impact craters and chemical analyses of SNC
meteorites suggest that Mars has been volcanically active in the recent past
and thus could still be volcanically active today. Crater counts suggest that
parts of the surface could be as young as 10s years, a number consistent
with the estimated ages of the SNC meteorites, which suggest that volcanic
activity could have occurred as recently as l0 s years ago; geologically this
is very recent. However, even if the planet is currently volcanically active,
the rates of volcanic activity must be orders of magnitude lower than those
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found on Earth, because young surfaces are so restricted in area. There is
no direct evidence of current volcanic activity, such as thermal anomalies or
volcanism, which might be accompanied by hydrothermal activity. Sites of
such activity may be identified by venting of steam and/or local concentra-
tions of hydrothermal minerals. Alternatively, all of the hydrothermal ac-
tivity might be associated with subsurface environments without any sur-
face manifestations.
FORMER CLIMATIC CONDITIONS ON MARS
Although present-day Mars is very hostile to life, there are good reasons
to believe that Mars has experienced more hospitable conditions in the past.
The evidence is particularly strong for the very early history of the planet,
during the times that life first started on Earth. For most of Mars' history,
erosion rates would have been extremely low. However, terrains that date
from the early period are highly degraded and commonly dissected by branch-
ing valley networks. 14,15 The networks resemble dry terrestrial river valleys
and are thought to have been formed by slow erosion owing to running
water. Despite uncertainty about the precise conditions required for these
valleys to form, it is probable that some combination of high heat flow and
high surface temperatures is required. For small streams to flow any appre-
ciable distance, the surface temperature must be at or above 0°C. To main-
tain such a temperature, an atmosphere of at least 1 to 2 bars of CO 2 was
probably required. It has accordingly been suggested that about 3.5 billion
to 3.8 billion years ago the surface of Mars, being warm and wet, was
hospitable to life. 16 However, after this time most of the CO 2 was perma-
nently removed to form carbonates, and the surface of the planet evolved to
its present cold, dry conditions. If life started during the early era, it might
have survived at least for a time, either intact or as biochemical remnants in
isolated niches such as in hydrothermal systems, subsurface brines, or
endolithic environments.
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4Limits of Life on Earth:
Expansion of the Microbial World
and Detection of Life
The Task Group on Planetary Protection assessed past reports and cur-
rent views on the range of environmental conditions believed to exist on
Mars and reached the consensus that it is extremely unlikely that a terres-
trial organism could grow on the surface of Mars, although survival for
some time is possible. It is clear that the most extreme environments on
Earth where organisms can replicate are still considerably less extreme in
some parameters vital for life than are known to occur over most of the
martian surface. Particularly important in this regard are the high levels of
UV radiation, the thin atmosphere, the extremely low temperatures, and the
absence of liquid water on the surface of Mars.
This appraisal is based on our current understanding of the conditions on
Earth that limit cell growth; however, the task group emphasizes that al-
though it is extremely unlikely that terrestrial organisms could grow on the
surface of Mars, this does not imply that life does not exist anywhere on
Mars. There is far too little information to assess the possibility that life
may exist in subsurface environments associated with hydrothermal activity
or in selected microenvironments free from the harsh conditions already
mentioned, or to conclude that organisms resembling terrestrial life forms
did not evolve on Mars during the planet's early geological history.
The primary residual concern of the task group is with forward contami-
nation by intact cells or components of cells that could be detected by
sophisticated molecular methods in future expeditions designed to look for
evidence of extant or past life on Mars. The task group believes that this
concern necessitates that those involved in the planning of present and
future expeditions to Mars be appraised of new results obtained from
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studies of extreme environments as well as the inevitable extension of the
limits of environments where growth and survival can take place. Under-
scoring all of these advances in the microbiology of extreme environments
are parallel advances in the development of new methods and more accurate
and sensitive instruments for detecting the presence of life and life-related
molecules and for identifying their evolutionary relatedness.
It is not a straightforward matter to define the ranges of physical and
chemical conditions on Earth in which organisms can grow, replicate, or
survive for extended periods. During the 13 years since the SSB's last
report on planetary protection, _ bacteria have been detected or isolated from
many hostile environments on Earth, including the dry, extremely cold
surfaces and interstices of rocks in the dry valleys of the Antarctic, hot
environments associated with submarine and terrestrial volcanoes and
geothermal systems, and deep subsurface Sediments and aquifers. These
investigations are in their infancy, and we still know little about either most
of the organisms inhabiting these environments or in many cases the geo-
chemistry and geophysics of the environments.
In the last decade or so, a variety of novel organisms have been isolated.
They include hyperthermophiles capable of growing at 110°C, obligate baro-
philes capable of growing at the pressures found in the deepest ocean
trenches, and anaerobes capable of using iron, manganese, or even uranium
as electron acceptors. Similarly, a variety of strategies have been identified
by which microorganisms can survive environmental conditions that do not
allow growth, including low temperature and low nutrient conditions. Tra-
ditionally, endospore and cyst development were considered the principal
mechanisms for long-term survival by microorganisms, but it is now clear
that many microorganisms have mechanisms for long-term survival that do
not involve spore or cyst formation. It is now recognized that the inability
to culture many microorganisms is a widespread phenomenon apparent
with environmental samples and that only a few percent (or less) of organ-
isms detected by microscopic methods can usually be cultured. Examples
of the manifestation of organismal survival mechanisms include both the
miniaturization of cells and the attachment to surfaces.
EXTREME THERMOPHILES AND
VOLCANIC ENVIRONMENTS
Important recent discoveries and hypotheses, published across a diversity
of disciplines, have pointed to submarine hydrothermal vent systems, and
specifically to t',:eir subsurface crustal environments, as the likely site of
biochemical and even early bioIogical evolution. 2 The particular nature of
organisms that might have evolved on Mars is unknown. As to organisms
that may have been transported to Mars from Earth during Archaean born-
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bardments, there is strong phylogenetic evidence, based on both 16S rRNA
sequence comparisons of a large number of organisms and geological evi-
dence, that the earliest groups of microorganisms to inhabit Earth were
anaerobic hyperthermophiles (growth at 90°C or higher). 3"4 These organ-
isms, which utilize carbon and energy sources found in hydrothermal and
geothermal systems and possess unusual mechanisms for growth at tempera-
tures exceeding 100°C, constitute a distinct phylogenetic group of organisms
that share some characteristics with other bacteria and eucaryotes as well.
Originally classified as a distinct kingdom, the archaebacteria are now classi-
fied in the domain Archaea and are more closely related to the domain of the
Eucarya (formerly eucaryota) than to the Bacteria (formerly eubacteria). 5
Hyperthermophiles are significant to a discussion of planetary protection
issues because of evidence already presented that active volcanism may
occur on Mars today. Implied is that hydrothermal activity would accom-
pany volcanism because of water entrapped in the martian crust. Although
the chance that a hyperthermophilic Archaea from Earth would contaminate
Mars at a location that would allow growth is extremely remote, these
organisms could be more significant with respect to back contamination,
and as Earth analogues to past martian life if life ever existed on Mars.
Among the many unusual properties of hyperthermophilic Archaea, those
properties important to concerns about planetary protection include the prob-
ability of survival and growth under any of the ranges of physical and
chemical conditions that exist on Mars. Unfortunately, we know consider-
ably less about the survival of hyperthermophilic Archaea than we know
about Bacteria, spores, fungi, and viruses. Only recently have extremely
thermostable enzymes from vent hyperthermophiles been purified and char-
acterized. For example, an amylase from Pyrococcusfuriosus--a heterotroph
capable of growing at temperatures up to 103°C--has a half-life of 2 hours
in an autoclave at 120°C and is active at 140°C. 6 A purified ct-glucosidase,
with a half-life of 48 hours at 98°C, reaches optimal activity in the tempera-
ture range of 105 to i15°C. 7 The other extremely thermal stable enzymes
studied from hyperthermophiles include ferredoxin, hydrogenase, serine pro-
tease, glyceraldehyde-3-phosphate dehydrogenase, and a never-before-
described tungsten-iron-sulfur enzyme from P. furiosus that catalyzes a de-
hydrogenase-like reaction of very tow potential at 100°C) Besides pro-
teins, other macromoiecules from hyperthermophiles, including DNA and
membrane lipids, must also have some unusual properties. Recently, the
presence of a reverse gyrase, which catalyzes positive supercoiling of circu-
lar DNA, was discovered in all hyperthermophiles tested. 9 It was suggested
that supercoiling of DNA imparts thermostability.
Questions regarding thermal stability of Archaea cells and their macro-
molecules and synthetic systems have only recently been addressed. Pre-
liminary results, however, point to unique structures and mechanisms for
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growth and survival under some of the more extreme conditions on Earth,
although these conditions are not nearly so severe as surface conditions on Mars.
LIFE IN EXTREME ENVIRONMENTS
Dormant Forms of Life
Endospores from the gram-positive bacteria are ubiquitous and perhaps
the most resistant and survivable form of life on Earth. They are known to
survive for thousands of years and are resistant to freezing, desiccation, and
vacuum and are highly resistant to many disinfectants. Bacterial spores are
also moderately resistant to heat and to UV and ionizing radiation. Some
spores germinate whenever there is free water, ranging in temperature from
subfreezing to superboiling. Recognition of the ability of spores to survive
such harsh conditions has led previous committees to focus on bacterial
endospores as a major concern in planetary protection.
Recent studies utilizing the NASA Long Duration Exposure Facility
(LDEF) have shown good survival of multilayers of bacterial spores, which
had been fortified with buffer and nutrients, after 6 years of exposure to
space vacuum. _° When spores were not shielded from solar radiation, their
survival was reduced to 10 -2 to 104 percent. These results suggest that the
vacuum and cold conditions of space pose no particular barriers for spore
survival, but in the absence of shielding from UV radiation, there is little
chance for the survival of dormant spores transported through the space
environment. Other studies have focused on comparisons of the survival
rates of spores exposed to UV irradiation under atmospheric and vacuum
conditions, and at a variety of temperatures. TM Conditions simulating
interstellar space or those of the surface of Mars inactivate spores rather
quickly, suggesting that any long-term survival of unshielded spores on
Mars would be impossible. It has not been possible to specify the mecha-
nism of spore inactivation, although it appears that spore photoproducts,
such as thymine dimers, are not responsible. 13 On the basis of such labora-
tory experiments, it has been proposed that with proper shielding, bacterial
spores might survive UV irradiation for very long periods, perhaps millions
of years, t4
Deep-Subsurface Microbes
Experiments since 1984 supported by the Department of Energy (DOE)
have allowed the recovery of viable bacteria from subsurface sediments 500
to 700 meters below Earth's surface. _5 In these experiments, there is clear
evidence that the organisms recovered from the deep subsurface are not
contaminants from the surface, from more superficial sedimentary horizons,
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or from the drilling fluids. These organisms are found in Middendorf Cre-
taceous sediments, which are 100 million years old and form an aquifer in
which the time for ground water recharge is at least 15,000 to 20,000. The
ground water from the bore holes contains traces of refractory carbon and
about 2 milligrams of oxygen per liter. For the oxygen to be maintained in
the face of a living microbiological community of 106 microbes per cubic
centimeter, the growth rate in terms of the doubling time of these organisms
must be between 10,000 and 20,000 years, t6 Based on analysis of total 16 S
rRNA sequences from these organisms, it is known that they constitute
primarily a subset of unique Pseudomonas and Arthrobacter species. They
clearly have the capacity to exist in a viable but dormant state for very long
periods of time. These organisms appear to have a highly developed capac-
ity to repair their DNA as evidenced by their very high resistance to UV
radiation. The ability of Earth microbes with a full complement of enzymes
to exist in relatively suspended animation for extended periods, yet to be
ready for instant growth, has direct implications for planetary protection
requirements related to forward contamination as well as sample return.
The ability to maintain efficient DNA repair in the absence of cell division
(which these organisms are apparently able to do) is a property that may be
of great advantage for long-term survival in space and on Mars.
Extreme Halophiles
A preliminary (and as yet unpublished) report involving halophilic bacte-
ria was presented to the task group and deserves at least a passing mention
here. Microorganisms embedded in crystals of salt have recently been
identified at the DOE Waste Isolation Pilot Project high-intensity storage
site in New Mexico. The salt deposits have been dated as being approxi-
mately 200 million years old. Extremely halophilic bacteria, of the domain
Archaea, have been cultured from the interior of the salt crystals, which
suggests the possibility that bacteria have remained viable within the salt
crystals. Such a potential for extended survival and the capacity of these
organisms for growth in brines, which may be present in the martian sub-
surface, make this group of extreme halophiles very interesting with regard
to possible types of organisms to look for in the search for extant or past
life on Mars. With regard to forward contamination, the possibility that
such an organism could reach a suitable environment, even if it survived the
trip through space, seems vanishingly small.
Cryptoendoliths
Some microorganisms in the Antarctic have adapted to extremes of low
temperature, high winds, and lack of water by forming communities within
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sandstone. Inside the rock, an increased relative humidity provides ad-
equate water for growth, and light penetration is adequate for photosynthe-
sis for very short periods that occur no more often than 2 to 5 days per
year. 17 For example, in the Dry Valley region of Antarctica, a microbial
ecosystem exists in the interstices of porous sandstone, complete with pri-
mary producers (lichen algae, green algae, and cyanobacteria) and primary
microbial consumers (decomposers such as yeast, bacteria, and filamentous
fungi), but lacking higher trophic-level consumers. 18,19 This microbial com-
munity has apparently adapted to life in these rocks to avoid the harsh
external conditions, which include (1) high-velocity winds, (2) low tem-
peratures (the rocks warm to above-freezing temperatures due to their low
albedo and high thermal inertia), (3_Iow moisture (the rocks retain water
from snow melt), and (4) high UV flux on the surface. Conditions of light,
temperature, and water that permit slow metabolic rates occur only rarely,
perhaps for about 100 to 200 hours per year, and rates of cellular metabo-
lism and growth in these communities are perhaps the lowest found on
Earth. (For example, the carbon turnover, a reflection of metabolic rate,
has been estimated to be on the order of 10,000 to over 20,000 years. 2° All
the inorganic nutrients needed for growth come from the minerals in the
rock matrix and thus are not limiting to the community. 21 The community
can carry out photosynthetic metabolism at temperatures as low as -8°C.
Cryptoendolithic lipids, which can stay fluid to -20°C, may be important
for the organisms to metabolize in such cold conditions. 22 Clearly these
microbes have adapted to harsh environmental conditions, and these com-
munities may provide reasonable models for survival strategies that
might be adopted by microbes as conditions change from above-freezing
temperatures and flowing water to temperatures below 0°C and limited
free water.
Barophiles
If liquid water is present at kilometer depths on Mars, microbial life in
that environment may face environmental conditions similar to those expe-
rienced by the barophilic bacteria isolated from the deep sea on Earth.
Pressure is a significant factor in the growth of the barophilic bacteria, with
the optimal pressure for growth being similar to the pressures found in
the deep-sea regions from which the bacteria were isolated. 23 Studies of
these bacteria will help to establish the limits of pressure that can be toler-
ated by life on Earth and will guide future life-detection experiments
conducted beneath the surface of Mars. For instance, is it possible that
liquid water exists at depth (due to geothermal heating) and supports a
community of barophilic organisms similar to those described for Earth
organisms?
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Radiation-Resistant Bacteria
There is a wide range of microbial sensitivity to radiation stress induced
by either UV or ionizing radiation. Although the two types of radiation are
physically quite different, they are usually considered together, as the site
of damage for both is the genetic material (DNA), and the modes of coping
with the ensuing radiation damage are fundamentally similar. 24 Although
microorganisms are generally resistant to the radiolytic effects of low-level 25
and chronic irradiation, only a few notable species are known to survive
high levels of irradiation even remotely similar to those that would be faced
on Mars, or in interstellar space. Vegetative cells of Deinococcus (formerly
Micrococcus) radiodurans isolates can typically withstand doses of UV
light and gamma radiation characteristically withstood by bacterial spores.
The dose-response curves show large shoulders that extrapolate to 500
Jm -2 for UV radiation and 700 Krad for gamma radiation. Some isolates
have been found to survive single doses of 104 ergs cm -2, or 10 6 rads. 26-28
In addition, within a core of the Three Mile Island reactor and other com-
mercial reactors, microorganisms have been isolated after exposure to very
high levels of radiation. Probably all vegetative cells, even those of the
extremely resistant forms, possess similar mechanisms for coping with ra-
diation stress. 29 These mechanisms have been studied intensively in Escherichia
coli and other well-characterized bacteria. The alterations that occur and
that allow organisms to tolerate levels of radiation flux higher by orders of
magnitude than those tolerated by E. coli are not yet well characterized. In
general, both prokaryotes and eukaryotes show greater rates of mutation
when subjected to increased UV fluxes, and these mutations are thought to
be induced during the processes that repair radiation-induced lesions. Al-
though it seems clear that increased mutagenesis is associated with rapid
DNA repair, the repair mechanisms are not well understood for populations
subject to UV stress for extended periods of time. It should also be men-
tioned that the studies of these responses discussed here have focused pri-
marily on vegetative cells; as discussed elsewhere, the situation for the
highly resistant bacterial spores might be quite different.
LIFE DETECTION FOR PLANETARY PROTECTION
(INCLUDING BIOBURDEN DETERMINATION)
Techniques for assessing the existence of microorganisms have advanced
dramatically since pre-Viking days, and these advances will strongly affect
bioburden assessment procedures as well as future life-detection experi-
ments. Until the mid 1970s, the major methodology used for detecting
microbes was the counting of viable colony-forming units (CFUs) on vari-
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ous defined media. NASA procedures carefully outlined the swabbing pro-
cedures and media to be used to assess "cleanliness. ''3°,31 Beginning with
epifluorescence microscopy, new methods with greater sensitivity and specificity
have rapidly appeared. The task group strongly recommends that efforts
be made to explore current analytical methods for use in bioburden
assessment and inventory procedures. New procedures for bioburden
assessment must be established before the spacecraft that are designed
to detect life are assembled and launched.
In addition to the epifluorescent microscopic techniques developed for
counting viable cells, many other new methods have been developed that
involve the detection of specific biomarkers that are components of cells.
Such biomarkers may provide a sensitive means for detection without the
necessity for release of attached microbes from the substratum (needed for
most microscopic counting) or the efficient growth of each propagule. Cir-
cumventing the requirement for cultivation is crucial, since it is estimated
that fewer than 10 percent of the microorganisms present in most environ-
mental samples have been cultivated. Thus there is a risk that techniques
that rely on cultivation will not detect the majority of the microbial popula-
tion in a given sample.
In addition to obviating the need for cultivation, these techniques are ap-
pealing because of their extreme sensitivity. In some cases, single cells can be
detected and identified. However, due to this sensitivity, life-detection ex-
periments using these techniques may be compromised if the bioload of the
spacecraft is not also monitored using the same technologies.
Viable But Nonculturable Organisms
A recently recognized problem is that some organisms are fully func-
tional even though they are not culturable with the usual microbiological
techniques. This has been shown most clearly with the cholera-causing
pathogen Vibrio cholerae. This organism, when attached to chitin substrata
under starvation conditions, is not culturable in any of the standard media,
but it is fully infectious if given to a suitable host animal. 32 It is now
recognized that nonculturability is a widespread phenomenon in environ-
mental samples. In surface soils, direct microscopic counts of stained bac-
teria show that less than I percent of the organisms seen by epifluorescence
microscopy can subsequently be recovered by direct plating and grown
to form colonies. Clearly, the previously used procedures for counting
viable organisms are insufficient to help assess potential contamination by
organisms that could possibly reproduce on another planet or on spacecraft
components.
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Epifluorescence Microscopy
In the early 1970s epifluorescence microscopy began to be used for the
detection of potentially viable (i.e., nucleic acid-containing) microbes. The
method involves using fluorescent dyes, such as acridine orange, that bind
to DNA and RNA and then directly examining and counting fluorescent
particles under UV illumination. Such procedures showed that viable count
methodology (e.g., the methods used in bioload assessment for the Viking
mission) drastically underestimates the actual microbial population.
Although obtaining acridine dye epifluorescent counts cannot give infor-
mation as to species composition, coupling fluorescent microscopy to other
approaches can do so. Specific oligonucleotide probes labeled with fluores-
cent dyes can be used to identify and quantitate individual taxonomic
groups. 3-_,34 Such technology may have great importance in the identifi-
cation and quantitation of targeted groups of microbes during bioburden
assessment.
Lipids as Biomarkers
One technique that has recently been widely used to detect and identify
microbes is based on the extraction of membrane lipids. 35 Lipids provide
two advantages as biomarkers. The extraction of lipids from cells in their
environmental matrix is quantitative and allows both a simple purification
as well as a concentration step. Extraction has classically been performed
with a one-phase chloroform-methanol-water system that requires the use of
potentially toxic solvents as well as a prolonged period of exposure to the
extraction solutions. Recent use of supercritical fluid carbon dioxide with
suitable polar modifiers has made rapid and semi-automatable extraction
techniques possible.
Detailed analysis of the extracted lipid biomarkers provides quantitative
evidence for the presence of viable components of the microbial commu-
nity. The polar lipid fraction of the extract is polar by virtue of the pres-
ence of primarily phosphate esters. These polar lipid phosphate esters are
metabolically labile. During growth or after death, the polar lipids show a
relatively rapid turnover by phospholipases inside or external to the cells
so that the polar lipid content rapidly disappears from nonliving cells. The
dephosphorolated neutral lipid molecular components of the original
polar lipids are then readily detected. Consequently, the detection of spe-
cific polar lipids provides a quantitative definition of the viable or poten-
tially viable cellular biomass and requires no growth or recovery of intact
microbes.
Because different groups of microbes contain identifiable specific pat-
terns of lipid components, detailed examination of the structure of the lipid
allows definition of the community structure of the microbial community.
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The changes in the lipid component structures also correlate with the nutri-
tional status of the microbiota and with recent exposures to some toxic
stresses. Thus the lipid analysis can provide direct evidence of lipid syn-
thetic gene activity as well as the viable biomass, community structure, and
nutritional status of the community. Since this technique could provide a
means to detect the presence of extant or fossil life on Mars, it is important
to prevent potential contamination of spacecraft by specific microbial
lipids.
Nucleic Acids as Biomarkers
Nucleic acids are the second group of biomarkers that have received
considerable attention in the past several years. Both RNA and DNA pro-
vide suitable markers for identifying and quantitating groups of organisms
or individual strains of microorganisms. Much of this research in microbial
ecology has focused on the use of ribosomal RNAs (rRNAs), both for the
identification of microorganisms and for the production of unique nucleic
acid probes used for quantitation and for in situ hybridizations. One obvi-
ous advantage to using nucleic acids for microbial identification is that
limiting amounts of nucleic acids can readily be amplified up to a million-
fold, permitting the analysis of only a few molecules of nucleic acid. Am-
plifications are currently performed either with the polymerase chain reac-
tion, in which a thermostable DNA polymerase is used to amplify a template
following denaturation of the template DNA, annealing of suitable primers,
and extension of the primed template; or with self-sustained sequence repli-
cation, an isothermal mode of amplification modeled after viral replication.
Following the acquisition of nucleic acids, the targeted gene sequences
(usually from an rRNA-encoding gene) are analyzed and used to determine
the identity of microorganisms in the sample. This information can also be
used to design nucleic acid probes for use in future studies and for monitor-
ing the relative abundances of microorganisms in a sample. Since this
technology is currently available, life-detection experiments that may use
these techniques need to be conducted in an environment that is not con-
taminated by nucleic acids.
Detection of Spore-forming Bacteria
The swab-and-culture technique used to detect spore-forming microbes
as sterilization-resistant contaminants can be improved by biomarker re-
covery, which obviates the requirement that organisms be cultured for de-
tection. Recovery of 2-4 diamino pimelic acid and/or a signature rRNA
sequence could provide a quantitative biomarker for gram-positive spore-
forming bacteria.
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Detection of Chirality as an Indicator of Bioprocesses
It is particularly important to apply stringent bioload-reduction technol-
ogy to those missions anticipated to involve the detection of past or present
life. One of the most sensitive detection methods will involve the determi-
nation of a significantly greater than expected chirality in components of
polymers such as peptides. This is one of the most characteristic features of
life on Earth. Recent advances in the use of chiral derivatizing agents or
stationary phases in column chromatography coupled with the detection of
specific analytes on cooled germanium disks (which allow matrix-assisted
microscopic Fourier transform infrared spectroscopy) provide ultrasensitive
methodology that could be adapted to systems for detecting microbial con-
tamination of spacecraft. It should be mentioned, however, that such tech-
niques require significant amounts of material in comparison to molecular
amplification methods such as the polymerase chain reaction.
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5Assessment of the 1978 Report
REVIEW
The 1978 report of the then Space Science Board's Committee on Plan-
etary Biology and Chemical Evolution established a quarantine policy for
exploratory, one-way missions to Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus, Neptune,
and Titan planned for 1974 to 1994. I The recommendation of the 1978
report was that precautionary measures be taken to minimize forward con-
tamination of these planets by terrestrial microorganisms so as not to jeop-
ardize future life-detection experiments.
The criteria used for planetary contamination prior to the 1978 report
were those established by international agreement through the Committee
on Space Research (COSPAR). They stipulated that the probability of
contamination (P_.) should be less than 1 x 10-3 for each planet. The Pc was
estimated using a formula that also included the probability of growth (Pg)
of a terrestriaI microorganism on each of the planets. There was some
difficulty in arriving at a sensible and useful Pg, necessitating that the 1978
committee be charged with the task of comprehensively evaluating Pg based
on available knowledge of the physical and chemical properties of the sur-
face and atmosphere of each planet and conditions that limit life as we
know it.
Although the 1978 committee considered the Pu for all the planets being
considered for exploration through 1994, the current report is limited to an
evaluation of information and past recommendations for Mars. The 1978
report attempted to evaluate the Pg for three separate regions on Mars
and included above- and below-surface subpolar areas and the polar caps.
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Although the committee expressed a reluctance in recommending a particu-
lar value for Pg, they argued that while the Pg for Mars is exceedingly low,
the probability is not zero. Furthermore, the Viking mission, although use-
ful in arriving at a Pg for subpolar sites, did not offer any insight on geochem-
ical characteristics and the possibility of liquid water at the polar caps. The
committee recommended a P_ of less than 10 -1° for the subpolar regions of
the planet within 6 centimeters of the surface, less than 10 -8 for subsurfaces
in subpolar regions, and less than 10 7 for the polar ice caps. These ranges
for P8 values reflect Viking data for subpolar regions, including those re-
suits that indicated the presence of strong oxidants, observed organic com-
pounds, water, and the possibility that liquid water could exist seasonally
and diurnally at the polar caps. The Pg values were arrived at subjectively
and have become a matter for debate.
It is clear that considerable uncertainty has been engendered by the prob-
abilistic approach to planetary protection. This concern has been restated
over the years by virtually every group that has analyzed the problem, and
indeed by NASA. Many unknowns must be factored into such elements as
the probability of growth of a terrestrial organism on the martian surface,
for example, so that estimating the potential for biological contamination of
Mars is difficult if not impossible. However, the trend is clear: as we have
learned more about Mars, our expectations regarding the likelihood of ter-
restrial microbial contamination have been reduced, and estimates of the
probability of growth have been steadily lowered as a result.
Following the 1978 report, whose recommendations were generally ac-
cepted, NASA began to look for ways to simplify planetary protection pro-
cedures as they applied to particular upcoming planetary missions, and also
to minimize the use of mathematical models and quantitative analyses. These
studies culminated in a report to COSPAR in 1984 that greatly deemphasized
the probabilistic approach and introduced the concept of categories based
on target planet and mission type. 2 This approach directly reflects the
degree of concern for a given planet in the context of a particular type of
mission.
Five categories of target planet and mission-type combinations and their
particular suggested ranges of requirements were proposed in the 1984 re-
port, and these were accepted by COSPAR. The five categories are summa-
rized below; details are contained in the 1984 report (see also Table E.1,
Appendix E).
• Category I missions include any mission to a target planet that is not
of direct interest for understanding the process of chemical evolution. In
effect, no protection of such planets (e.g., Mercury, Pluto) is warranted, and
no planetary protection requirements are imposed.
• Category II missions are all types of missions to those target planets
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that are of significant interest for understanding the process of chemical
evolution, but for which there is only a remote chance that contamination
carried by a spacecraft could jeopardize future exploration. The concern is
primarily over unintentional impact, since these missions are not designed
to land.
• Category III missions are certain types of missions (flyby and orbiter)
to a target planet of interest for understanding the chemical evolution and/or
the origins of life, or for which scientific opinion suggests a significant
chance of contamination that could jeopardize a future biological experi-
ment.
• Category IV missions are certain types of missions (mostly probe and
lander) to a target planet of interest for understanding chemical evolution
and/or the origins of life, or for which scientific opinion suggests a signifi-
cant chance of contamination that could jeopardize future biological experi-
ments.
• Category V missions include all Earth-return missions. The concern
is for the protection of the terrestrial system as well as the scientific integ-
rity of the returned sample.
These recommendations, made by NASA, were approved by Subcommis-
sion F (life sciences) and subsequently by the executive committee of
COSPAR, and they have been implemented by NASA. The task group
believes that approval and implementation of these recommended categories
constitute a significant step forward in the process of simplifying and imple-
menting planetary protection procedures.
A goal in this report is to reassess current planetary protection guidelines
in light of new knowledge and new technology. The task group was asked
to comment only on Mars lander missions that do not involve in situ extant
life-detection experiments and has tried to do so, although it was admittedly
difficult for task group members to exclude life-detection and sample return
missions from their thinking. This group's approach, which is somewhat
different from that taken in earlier studies, is intended to contribute to
planetary studies as they relate to questions about the origins of life, while
keeping secure our profoundly important scientific objectives.
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK GROUP
Forward Contamination
The task group views the problem of forward contamination as separable
into two principal issues. The first centers_on the potential for growth, in
the martian environment, of whatever fractions of spacecraft populations of
microorganisms are able to survive transit from Earth to the surface of
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Mars. The second involves importation of terrestrial organic contaminants,
living or dead, in amounts sufficient to compromise the search for evidence
of past or present life on Mars itself.
The guidelines on probability of growth (Pu) issued by the Space Science
Board in 1978 were recently reassessed in a 1991 NASA report, Planetary
Protection Issues for the MESUR Mission: Probability of Growth (pg).3
Comments and estimates made by the contributors point to P_ values for
terrestrial organisms on Mars that are probably lower than the 1978 esti-
mates. Their consensus was that an exceedingly small Pg was necessitated
by the low probability of liquid water existing on Mars and the low prob-
ability of an appropriate terrestrial organism occupying a particular martian
environment and growing there. However, Ps was not judged to be zero
because of the possibility that suitable martian microhabitats could
conceivably exist.
Based on the findings of the MESUR mission workshop on the probabil-
ity of growth as well as on the arguments presented below, the task
group agreed that the Pg value for terrestrial organisms on Mars is so small
as to be of no consequence. Therefore, the need for severe reduction of
spacecraft bioload solely to prevent the spread of replicating terrestrial or-
ganisms on Mars is no longer paramount. However, this is clearly not the
case as far as contamination of a possible past or extant martian biosphere
is concerned. The reduction of bioload on all lander missions to Mars must
continue to be seriously addressed. The sophistication of current molecular
analytical techniques is such that single cells are detectable, and so the
issue of spacecraft cleanliness is particularly crucial when life-detection
experiments are included in the scientific payload. Aside from considera-
tions related to life-detection experiments, spacecraft cleanliness (particu-
larly the biological-organic burden) is extremely important (1) in order to
greatly minimize the introduction of foreign material into any site likely to
be of biological interest in subsequent missions, and (2) to minimize con-
tamination of experimental devices that are particularly sensitive to biologi-
cal and chemical contamination (i.e., optic and spectrophotometric devices).
The deliberations of the task group on the issue of forward contamina-
tion hazards posed by the planned set of U.S. and Soviet lander missions
summarized in Chapter 2 were greatly aided by NASA's 1991 report on the
MESUR mission and by comprehensive briefings given by experts on mat-
ters relevant to this issue (see workshop presentations listed in Appendix
C). These deliberations led the task group to unanimous concurrence with
the following conclusion:
Forward contamination, solely defined as contamination of the martian
environment by growth of terrestrial organisms that have potential for growth
on Mars, is not a significant hazard. However, forward contamination
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more broadly defined to include contamination by terrestrial organic mat-
ter associated with intact cells or cell components is a significant threat to
interpretation of results of in situ experiments specifically designed to
search for evidence of extant or fossil martian microorganisms. 4
Based on this consensus, the task group makes the following recommen-
dations for control of forward contamination, each tied to specific mission
objectives:
1. Landers carrying instrumentation for in situ investigation of ex-
tant martian life should be subject to at least Viking-level sterilization
procedures. Specific methods for sterilization are to be determined; Vi-
king technology may be adequate, but requirements will undoubtedly be
driven by the nature and sensitivity of the particular experiments. The
rationale for this requirement is the reduction, to the greatest feasible ex-
tent, of contamination by terrestrial organic matter that is deposited at the
site by microorganisms or organic residues carried on the spacecraft. This
approach, when coupled with molecular analytical methods for assessment
of bioload, should allow both elimination of the most troublesome
contaminants and an inventory of those few that remain.
2. Spacecraft (including orbiters) without biological experiments should
be subject to at least Viking-level presterilization proceduresmsuch as
clean-room assembly and cleaning of all componentsmfor reduction of
bioload, but such spacecraft need not be sterilized. This recommenda-
tion has important implications for the planetary protection program in gen-
eral, in that it implies that there need be no requirement with regard to
orbiter lifetimes if the orbiter is subject to a Viking-level reduction of bioload
by clean-room assembly and cleaning.
As discussed above, the task group concurs with the conclusion, ex-
pressed in NASA's 1991 report, _ that the probability of growth of a terres-
trial organism on present-day Mars is essentially zero. However, the task
group recommends bioload reduction for anything sent to the martian sur-
face. Major advances in our ability to detect cellular material have oc-
curred over the last decade, and future advances will undoubtedly follow.
Reducing contamination of the planet by reducing the bioload on landed
vehicles will minimize the chances of jeopardizing future experiments
designed to detect material of possible biological origin.
These conclusions and recommendations on the issue of forward con-
tamination are based on several considerations discussed earlier in this re-
port. The task group concurs with the MESUR workshop panelists' consen-
sus that P8 is extremely low, and probably significantly below the upper
limits estimated by the 1978 committee. Given the likelihood that Ps is
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extremely low, the task group sees no utility in further attempts to estimate
its probable value in various martian environmental regimes. In the ab-
sence of crucial data relating to the potential of terrestrial organisms to
survive and grow on Mars, such exercises are purely subjective. Although
some progress toward quantification of Pg could perhaps be realized in well-
designed laboratory simulation experiments, the task group is not optimistic
that the central question of the presence and duration of a liquid water
phase in the near-surface martian regolith environment can be unambigu-
ously addressed without more information obtainable possibly only from in
situ measurements on Mars itself, or from returned samples--or conceiv-
ably from neither.
The task group believes that the recommendations set out above strike an
appropriate balance between the obligation for conservatism on the issue of
forward contamination insofar as Pg is concerned, and the need to gather
the data, that will eventually allow that issue to be settled definitively. It
is implicit in these recommendations that the approach used in previous
attempts to calculate the probability of contamination (Pc) be abandoned. In
support of abandoning the method, the task group worked through some
sample calculations of P, to demonstrate the nonutility of the probabilistic
approach. P,. is correctly expressed, per unit of microbial burden, as the
product of Ps and Pt, where Pt is the probability of an organism's survival
during transit from Earth surface to Mars surface. Pt is usually expressed
as Pt = P(VT) x P(UV) x P(R) x P(A) x P(SA), with P(VT) and P(UV)
representing the probabilities of an organism's surviving exposure to
space vacuum and temperature and to ultraviolet radiation, respectively;
P(R) the probability of an organism's release from a lander to the martian
surface; and P(A) and P(SA) the probabilities of an organism's arriving at
the planet and surviving atmospheric entry. Presumption of a successful
mission sets P(A) equal to 1 and P(SA) equal to near 1. Data on P(VT) and
P(UV) are lacking for most of the recently discovered highly specialized
organisms described above, but it is still possible to conservatively estimate
their product as 10 -I to 10 -2 or less. (The task group notes that appropriate
laboratory simulation experiments to evaluate these probabilities for
candidate microorganisms are entirely feasible, since both the spacecraft
geometry and the characteristics of its space environment can be well
determined.) P(R) is interpreted as the probability of release of that frac-
tion of the total bioburden located on surfaces in direct contact with the
martian regolith. With special attention to cleaning such surfaces, perhaps
combined with prelaunch UV irradiation, it seems feasible to reduce P(R)
to t0 .2 to 10 -3 without total spacecraft sterilization. Then, even with the
1978 SSB value for Pa of less than 10-I°, the product of Pu x Pt seems
unlikely to exceed about l0 -14 per unit of microbial burden. This nominally
allows a large bioload approaching 1011 (say, 105 organisms per square
ASSESSMENT OF THE 1978 REPORT 49
centimeter on a spacecraft surface area of 100 square meters) while still
retaining the COSPAR value for P,. of 10 -3. The task group also notes that
this bioload is the total microbial burden. Consideration of only those
species with capabilities for surviving in the most extreme environments
would reduce Pc for them, probably by a relatively large factor. Another
factor to consider is the possibility of such extreme environments existing
on Mars, some of which may be hospitable to certain organisms. Clearly, if
such niches exist, the Pg may be greater for a population of contaminating
organisms if they are widely dispersed, thus raising the probability of their
encountering a less hostile environment.
It was the intent of the task group to illustrate the uncertainties involved
in the probabilistic approach by performing the above calculations. With so
many uncertain probabilities multiplied by each other, the likelihood of
achieving a meaningful P(. is very low indeed. When these problems are
combined with the fact that the range of environments onMars is not yet
known, the futility of assigning a meaningful P, is further exemplified.
The task group emphasizes that the philosophical intent of the 1978
committee to protect Mars from terrestrial contamination so as not to jeop-
ardize future life-detection experiments on Mars is still profoundly impor-
tant. Recommendation l above deals with the issue of contamination by
nonviable but intact cells and biochemical components from terrestrial or-
ganisms, independent of whatever low Pu value they may have.
Back Contamination
A detailed assessment of the complex issue of sample return does not lie
within the present charge of this task group. Chapter 6 discusses some of
the martian environmental unknowns, and the data required to address them,
that will be central to evaluation of possible hazards posed by back con-
tamination.
SCIENTIFIC ISSUES--SUMMARY STATEMENT
As previously stated, it is the unanimous opinion of the task group that
terrestrial organisms have almost no chance of multiplying on the surface of
Mars and in fact have little chance of surviving for long periods of time,
especially if they are exposed to wind and to UV radiation. However,
current techniques to detect life, such as those that use specific biomarkers,
are much more sensitive than techniques used at the time of the Viking
mission, making contamination a serious threat to experiments designed to
look for life on Mars. With regard to this latter point, the recommendation
that landers be sterilized if they carry life-detection experiments, but only
have reduced bioloads in other instances, has long-range strategic implica-
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tions. Even if there is no organismal growth, local contamination is to be
expected around a nonsterilized spacecraft. Clearly a lander should not
return to do life-detection experiments at a site where unsterilized space-
craft have landed previously. For these reasons, the task group believes
that it is better to err on the side of caution. Thus the task group recom-
mends that spacecraft be cleaned rigorously to levels that are at least
equal if not superior to Viking levels. It does not believe that such
constraints are unduly restrictive to subsequent Mars exploration.
The task group also recommends that modern methods of bioburden
assessment and tabulation be developed for spacecraft destined for Mars
missions.
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6Additional Recommendations
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RESEARCH
Any future changes in recommendations made to ensure planetary pro-
tection, especially for piloted or sample return missions, will depend on the
acquisition of new data. To this end, the task group believes that a se-
quence of unpiloted missions to Mars, undertaken well before a piloted
mission, is imperative. One of the keys to deciphering the question of life
on Mars lies in knowing where to look; the Viking landing sites were not
optimum in this sense. They were selected primarily on the basis of consid-
erations of spacecraft safety, rather than scientific potential. Because of
this, we have a paucity of critical data needed to assess the possibility of
contemporary or ancient life on Mars. Data should be gathered from a
broad spectrum of sample sites with measurements focusing on data
most likely to contribute to a better understanding of the probability of
life on Mars. Among the classes of information needed are chemical (e.g.,
data on mineralogy, soil pH), physical (e.g., data on temperature, light--
qualitative and quantitative), and hydrological (i.e., data on the status of
water availability, historical and current). Until such data are available, it
will be impossible to make informed decisions concerning landing sites for
in-depth biological study. Such data also will greatly affect the ability to
make future decisions concerning the standards of rigor required for space-
craft cleanliness and possible sterilization.
The term planetary protection encompasses two very distinct concepts:
the forward contamination of Mars and the back contamination of Earth. In
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this report, the task group specifies the planetary protection policy it be-
lieves appropriate with regard to forward contamination, i.e., (1) steriliza-
tion in missions with life-detection goals and (2) a general rigorous reduc-
tion of bioload in all others. Although these differ from the 1978
recommendations, the rationale is grounded in the scientific consideration
of risk assessment (i.e., that the survival and/or growth of terrestrial organ-
isms transported to Mars is highly unlikely) and aspects that threaten mis-
sion goals (i.e., that life-detection experiments may be compromised by
spacecraft contaminants). However, the task group believes that there are
areas in which the lack of current available data limits both the formulation
of recommendations for planetary protection and the potential for mission
success.
To correct for this, the collection of certain data sets and the adoption of
the overall approach outlined below are strongly recommended. These rec-
ommendations emphasize the need to firmly characterize the existing envi-
ronmental conditions and the geochemical composition of Mars. This infor-
mation will serve two purposes: (1) it will allow informed estimates of the
potential for life (as we currently understand it) to exist on Mars and of the
potential threat of contamination posed by backward transport of such life
to Earth, and (2) it will identify those locations where life-detection mis-
sions should be sent. It is essential that these studies precede any life-
detection or piloted missions to the martian surface as well as any missions
designed to return samples to Earth.
Collection of Essential Data
Viking provided us with pictures of a martian surface varying widely in
its geomorphological features. Unfortunately, the Viking landers were lo-
cated in relatively featureless, exposed areas of the planet chosen on the
basis of landing safety. Therefore the data collected by these landers reflect
only this harsh physical and chemical environment. To establish a policy to
ensure planetary protection from back contamination, we need data from
locations with a much greater potential to support life. Measurements taken
from a variety of sites might allow specification of which martian environ-
ments might be least hostile to life; these will be very important sites for
collection of relevant data regarding environmental variables (e.g., water,
temperature, radiation) that might be used to predict the existence or sur-
vival of life forms. This approach would minimize any argument that the
potential for life (and therefore for the back contamination of Earth) is
underestimated by models incorporating data on only the harshest or least
hospitable conditions. These same issues are significant in the placement of
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life-detection landers on the planet; sites with the greatest potential to sup-
port life now or in the past must be identified.
It was not the charge of this task group to identify locations or specific
measurements or experiments for future missions; that is left to others.
However, the recommendation to locate martian landers in sites with the
maximal likelihood of fostering life might be further refined to suggest that
these sites may be determined from our rudimentary understanding of Mars
and our growing, but extensive, knowledge of the basic requirements of
life. The existence of contemporary life on Mars has been presumed un-
likely based on the lack of water, low temperatures, high UV flux, strongly
oxidizing surface chemistry, and other parameters. If these factors are
assumed to limit life, landers should be I0cated in those areas where it is
suspected that these conditions are least severe now or were so in the mar-
tian past. Given the consideration of water, a suitable site might lie in the
polar regions, in one of the fluvial features associated with earlier hydro-
logical activity, and/or in an area where geothermal vents are most likely to
be found.
In addition to selecting sites appropriate on a large scale, it is important
to consider the subsurface of Mars. Temperature, UV attenuation, and other
factors vary with depth and season and may offer a stable or transient
refuge for life. Thus within a site it may prove to be important to design
data collections that probe below the readily accessible surface, thus pro-
viding information on subsurface environments.
The surface of Mars may well be highly heterogeneous, even more so
than is now suspected. Microenvironments--whether on the surface or in
isolated vents, cracks, or layers of the subsurface--may exist now or may
have existed in the past. Properly designed experiments may be able to
address the issue of spatial and (perhaps) temporal heterogeneity and its
possible relationship to our ability to evaluate the biotic and abiotic status
of a given site.
Future sample return missions, piloted missions, and their associated quar-
antines will benefit from a planetary protection policy predicated on an
approach that yields the least conservative estimates of existing martian
life. Collection of the appropriate data should allow the scientific commu-
nity to amend recommendations for a planetary protection policy for back
contamination, perhaps resulting in recommendations similar to those that
this task group has made for altering current policy on forward contamina-
tion. In addition, the determination of current or inferred past geophysical
conditions on Mars may help in identifying locations where life-detection
missions should be sent. This information would certainly increase the
likelihood of success in meeting the goals of those missions.
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Assessment of Spacecraft Bioload
The task group's recommendation to "reduce" bioload on spacecraft in
all missions and to sterilize those spacecraft used in life-detection missions
assumes the use of Viking procedures.
However, the task group recommends against the use of the Viking pro-
tocols for assessment of spacecraft bioloads after these cleaning procedures
have been done. The 1980 guidelines for Viking bioload assessment I are
outdated and far less sensitive than the methods that will most likely be
used to detect martian life. We now know that many organisms are unde-
tected by standard culturing methods and that bioload estimates may, in
fact, represent only 1 percent of the organisms actually present.
The task group recommends that efforts be initiated immediately to
adopt state-of-the-art methods for use in the determination of bioload.
These methods should be the same as those most likely to be used in actual
life-detection experiments conducted on Mars. They would, therefore, have
the advantage of being sensitive enough to recognize low levels of biomarkers
and of obviating the need to culture microorganisms. Since a major con-
cern driving the task group recommendations is preventing the invalidation
of life-detection missions by spacecraft-borne contaminants, it is critical
that methods for assessing bioload be compatible with methods for detect-
ing life: methods for both assessment and detection must reflect the same
limits and sensitivity. Although it is not reasonable to demand that these
methods be used for upcoming launches, it is imperative that they be used
for missions involving life detection and that a program to implement them
be established as soon as possible.
Data on bioloads of Viking components and spacecraft are not relevant
to current life-detection procedures. It is absolutely necessary that NASA
investigate the bioload of component parts with state-of-the-art meth-
ods. Early funding of research designed to address the issue of detecting
biomarkers after application of various cleaning procedures could lead to
the use of less stringent means of reducing bioload. It would also allow
NASA to customize procedures for specific life-detection methods. As
there currently is no budget for this type of activity, the task group recom-
mends that NASA's Office of Planetary Protection be given funds for the
purpose of bioload research.
RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING OTHER ISSUES
Piloted Versus Unpiloted Missions
Plans for future missions to Mars include bringing samples back to Earth
as well as landing humans on Mars. Although humans may be effective,
and perhaps even necessary, for the detection of past life (e.g., by the
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collection and analysis of fossil-containing sediments and rocks), missions
carrying humans will contaminate the planet, thereby making the search for
extant life much more difficult. It is therefore critical that a major effort be
made to determine whether there are places in local martian environments,
such as active hydrothermal areas, where life might plausibly survive, and
to more closely examine these areas robotically, before contamination by
humans occurs. Relevant evidence could be obtained either by bringing
back samples to Earth for examination or by making in situ measurements.
Realistically, it is not likely that there will be near-term opportunities to
bring samples back to Earth. If sample return is not possible, then every
effort should be made to obtain chemical and physical measurements ger-
mane to the issue of life on Mars.
Societal and Legal Issues
The issues of forward and back contamination involved in missions to
Mars have societal and legal implications at international levels. They are
serious enough concerns in today's society to warrant discussion here.
A dominant force in the 1980s was the powerful wave of public concern
about environmental problems. The task group believes that these concerns
are real and continuing and should be given serious attention by NASA. A
substantial number of national and international organizations, active and
well funded, are on the alert for environmental abuse. There is every rea-
son to take seriously the concern (already expressed in some cases) about
contamination of Mars and almost certainly about the issue of back con-
tamination of Earth by martian samples. Although public concern over
such issues is often sincere and useful, it at times becomes distorted and
exaggerated in the media, sometimes in a sensationalist and nonproductive
way, leading to public misunderstanding and opposition. 2 In some cases,
these concerns have led to lengthy court actions. To forestall such unneces-
sary confrontation, the task group recommends that NASA make every
attempt to inform the public about current planetary protection plans
and provide continuing updates concerning Mars exploration and sample
return. The task group thinks that there is not likely to be great public
concern over the question of outbound contamination, especially if the pub-
lic understands the scientific objectives and is aware that the issue of con-
tamination has been addressed (and that appropriate precautions are being
taken). The better the effort at public education and the earlier it begins,
the smaller the likelihood that there will be public concern and negative
reaction. In the case of sample return missions, the task group believes that
the potential for negative reaction is much greater and that the need for
public education and involvement is therefore even greater.
In addition to the scientific aspects of planetary protection that need to
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be considered, there are also legal issues that must be addressed, involving
international restrictions as well as federal, state, and local statutes that may
come into play. A number of relevant statutes and regulations are written
by agencies as diverse as the Department of Agriculture, the U.S. Public
Health Service, the Department of Interior, and the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, all of which deal with the exposure of American citizens to
hazardous or toxic materials. International groups such as the United Na-
tions, the World Health Organization, and the International Labor Organiza-
tion have also attempted to address questions involving protection of Earth's
environment and minimization of risk to populations from space exploration
activity. In most cases, these documents lack specific details and contain
almost no scientifically based discussion of risk of contamination, precau-
tions needed, or procedures to follow in case of an accident. There are
currently no binding international agreements concerning forward or back
contamination) The task group believes it is essential (1) to assess the
legal limits (and implied liabilities) in existing legislation that relates to
martian exploration and (2) to pursue the establishment of interna-
tional standards that will safeguard the scientific integrity of research
on Mars, as well as provide protection for Earth and her inhabitants.
NASA should make a strong effort to obtain international agreement
for planetary protection issues. A strong international component will
help assuage possible domestic concern.
NASA should, even at this early date, acknowledge the problems out-
lined above and reestablish the kind of planetary protection program that
existed through the Viking Program. Although a planetary protection of-
ricer exists, there is no budgeted program to implement needed planetary
protection research, public education programs, and the like. The task
group recommends that NASA correct this situation as soon as possible
by redefining the responsibilities and authority of its planetary protec-
tion officer and by providing sufficient resources to carry out the rec-
ommendations made in this report.
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National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
Washington. D,C
20546
Reply to Atln of SBR
Dr. Louis Lanzerotti
Space Studies Board
National Academy of Sciences
2101 Constitution Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20418
Dear Dr. Lanzerotti:
NASA's efforts in planetary protection seek to preserve planetary conditions for future
biological and organic constituent exploration, and to protect Earth and its biosphere from
potential ex_aterresu'ial sources of contan_ination. As stated in the relevant NASA Management
lnslructions, the Space Science Board has been the primary group advising NASA on this issue
over the years, and continued advice on planetary protection from the Space Studies Board will
be needed to ensure that NASA policy in this area remains robust.
As you know, in the last year NASA has been working with the National Space Council to
define a Space Exploration Initiative that envisions future human missions to the moon and
Mars. In current planning, human missions to Mars are preceded by robotic missions that will
be defined in the early-1990's and may include Mars landers and the launch of a Mars Sample
Return near the turn of the century. In addition, the Soviet Union is currently planning a
mission that will place small landers on Mars in 1994, while the US Mars Observer mission is
still in operation around that planet. NASA planetary protection policy and its application to
future Mars missions will be dependent on the advice of the Space Studies Board, the lessons of
intervening Mars missions, and on NASA's ability to apply this information to follow-on
planning for an intensive program of Mars exploration.
Due to the timing of the planning for additional Mars missions, it would be appropriate to begin
to study the question of Mars planet:try protection within the Space Studies Board as soon as
possible. Because of the potential for planetary protection requirements to significantly impact
Mars missions, especially in light of the back-contamination issues attendant to a sample return,
it will be necessary to address Mars planetary protection issues in a dedicated fashion over the
next several years. Such a study is consistent with the recommendations of the recent National
Research Council review of the planning for the Space Exploration Initiative, which specifically
raised planetary protection as an issue. An initial report to NASA on Mars planetary protection
prior to the 1992 COSPAR meeting would also provide us with a robust US position as we
consider the nature of planetary protection on the Soviet Mars '94 mission, prior to its launch.
The nature of the planetary protection question has certainly changed in the years since the
Apollo and Viking missions, but new thoughts about life on Mars and the growing
environmental awtu-eness of the populace will continue to make planetary protection a
complicated issue in the future. Certainly it must be addressed as pan of a responsible program
of exploration. I will be happy to work with you to determine the nature of the study approach
to be taken by the Space Studies Bo:trd, and the timing for the study process and the reporting
of results.
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Your help in addressing the question of Mars planetary protection is greatly appreciated. I look
forward to helping you to define your study efforts in this area. Please contact me (453-1527)
if you need further information about this request.
Sincerely,
Jo nD_. Rummel, PhD
Planetary Protection Officer
Office of Space Science and Applications
osepti K. Alexander t
co:
S/Dr. Fisk
Mr. Alexander
SB/Dr. Nicogossian
SL/Dr. Briggs
NRC/Mr. Kastel
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NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL
COMMISSION ON PHYSICAL SCIENCES, MATHEMATICS, AND APPLICATIONS
210I Constitution Avenue Washington, D.C. 20418
SPACE STUDIES BOARD
Dr. John D. Rummel
Planetary Protection Officer
Office of Space Science and Applications
NASA
Washington, D.C. 20546
Dear Dr. Rummel:
October 22, 1990
Office Location
Milton Harris Building
Room 584
2001 W'tst'ol_ Avenue, NW
('2O2) 334-3477
Fax: (202) 334-3701
This is to acknowledge your letter of July 16, 1990 requesting advisory assistance from the
Space Studies Board concerning planetary protection issues associated with future Mars missions
and the Space Exploration Initiative. I understand that you, Joe Alexander and Wes Huntress
have met with members of the SSB staff to discuss this request. The following summarizes, as I
understand them, the major points raised in that discussion and describes how the Space Studies
Board proposes to respond to your request.
According to NASA Management Instructions, the Space Studies Board is the group
charged with providing advice to NASA concerning Planetary Protection Issues. The last time
the Board provided a comprehensive set of advice on Planetary Protection was in the 1978
report, Recommendations on Quarantine Policy for Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus, Nepture and
Titan. The most recent recommendations from the Board concerning Mars were in 1985 in
response to a request from NASA to provide advice on the categorization of the Mars Orbiter
mission.
It is our understanding that in its present request, NASA would like the Board to focus
on three major issues:
(1) To assess the status of the 1978 report in terms of what recommendations have been
implemented and what remains to be done.
(2) To describe what is known today concerning Mars and planetary protection issues,
including back contamination.
(3) To make recommendations concerning what research should be undertaken to address
those questions and issues that are relevant to current planetary protection concerns.
In carrying out the above study, the board will take into account current activities such as
the planned USSR 1994 Mars mission and the U.S. plans for both robotic and human missions
to Mars in the next century.
To conduct the above study, we propose the following. Under the direction of the Board,
a panel of experts will be selected and appointed. This panel of experts will concentrate on
those issues listed above in a workshop to be held in the summer of 1991. In addition to the
panel of experts, additional individuals will be invited to participate in the workshop including
NASA personnel, representatives from Europe, Japan and the Soviet Union. Given the
Nalimud RPstarch Caunczl is the p'fncl_l oT/craling agency of the National Academy of SHtmc_ end the National Acndtmy of Engin_ring
to _rrt_ Xtmcrnmcnt and a)lRrr arilamzattons
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COSPAR involvement in planetary protection, it would also IX desirable to include some
representatives from that body. It is likely that the workshop will IX preceded by one or two
organizational meetings of the panel. Following the workshop, we expect that there might be
additional meetings to finalize the panel's report. We expect that the report could be published
and transmitted to NASA by the Spring of 1992 in time for the 1992 COSPAR meeting.
I understand that at the present time, support for this effort has yet to be resolved. I
hope that NASA will find this approach responsive to your needs. I and the Board staff will
continue to work with you as we make plans for this effort.
Louis J. 'L_rot_i _
Chairman
Space Studies Board
cc: L. Fisk
J. Alexander
W. Huntress
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ReDly tO Afln of
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
'ffashington, D.C.
20546
SBR
Dr. Louis Lanzerotti
Space Studies Board
National Academy of Sciences
2101 Constitution Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20418
Dear Dr. Lanzerotti:
Thank you for your letter of October 22, 1990, in which you outl!ne your proposal to respond
to the NASA request of July 16, 1990 for advisory assistance on tssues concerning Mars
planetary protection.
The overall approach you have outlined for the Board's study of planetary protection issues is
appropriate:
1) Assess the status of the 1978 report and the implementation of its recommendations,
2) Describe the current knowledge of issues related to Mars planetary protection, and
3) Recommend research to be undertaken to address the questions and issues relevant to current
planetary protection concerns.
In pursuing this approach for the long tema, it is clear that the process will need to be iterative.
Some of the recommendations of the 1978 report remain to be implemented, but it is also likely
that the perspective gained over the intervening 13 years will lead the Board to reshape some of
those recommendations. Thereafter, resuhs of research conducted to implement the new
recommendations and the return of data from upcoming Mars missions (Mars Observer, and
potentially, Mars '94) will enable an update of the Board's advice in time to guide requirements
for future US lander and sample return missions.
Unfortunately, the same opportunity for an update will not be available to guide US policy with
respect to the USSR Mars '94 mission, our potential participation in that mission, and our
expectations of planet:try protection provisions to be taken by the Soviets. Because of the
expected timing of the mission, I believe it is important to receive the Board's advice on this
matter as soon as practicable. Accordingly, as one of the results of the workshop planned for
the summer of 1991, I am requesting that the Board provide an update of planetary protection
recommendations for Mars landers, based on presently available data. These recommendations
will provide an update to the requirements for planetary protection and the measures taken in
conjunction with the Viking landings on Mars, and will assist NASA in the formulation of a
policy applicable to landing missions that may be planned or launched in the near-term.
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The assistance of the Board in addressing these questions is greatly appreciated. I look f_cward
to working with you in carrying out this study.
Sincerely,
Jo n_D. Rummel, PhD
Planetary Protection Officer
Office of Space Science and Applications
S/Dr. Fisk
Mr. Alexander
SB/Dr. Nicogossi:m
SL/Dr. Huntress
NRC/Dr. Allen
Ms. Purcell
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WORKSHOP AGENDA
FINAL AGENDA
SPACE STUDIES BOARD PLANETARY PROTECTION WORKSHOP
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
ARNOLD AND MABEL BECKMAN CENTER
LECTURE ROOM
IRVINE, CALIFORNIA
SEPTEMBER 9-13, 1991
WO_ OB3"llOTIV'I_:
(1) To estsbliah i historical p_rspectiv* for Planetary
Protection requiremen[s
(S) To review exiating Guldelinel Lnd S_B Recommendationi
(8) To examine new scientific evidence pertinent to
Man Exploration and Plr,netaz,y Protection Requirements
Day 1 - Monday. Sentember 9. 1991
7:30 - 8:30 a.m. BREAKFAST - BECKMAN CENTER REFECTORY
8:00 - 9:00 REGISTRATION
9:00 Welcome - Introductions - Workshop Objectives Ken Nealson
Chairman
9:30
10:00
Review and Discussion of NASA Request
Historical Perspective and Some Issues
Pertinent to Planetary Protection Policy
John Rummel
NASA Hdqtrs
H. P. (Chuck) Klein
Santa Clara Univ
10:30 Review and Discussion -- Current Planetary John Rummel
Protection Categories and Guidelines NASA Hdqtrs
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11:00
11:45
NASA Mars Exploration Planning - Code SL
NASA SEI Mars Exploration Planning - Code RZ
Joe Boyce
NASA Hdqtrs
Lewis Peach
NASA Hdqtrs
12:15 p.m. LUNCH - BECKMAN CENTER REFECTORY
1:15 European Science Community Perspectives
on Planetary Protection Issues
Claudia Lindberg
Inst Aerospace
Medicine
FRG
1:45 USSR Mars Planning - Mars-94 and Beyond Michail Ivanov
USSR Academy
of Sciences
2:30 B R E A K
2:45
3:15
3:45
Overview of ARC 1990 Planetary Protection
Workshop - Purpose, Major Findings,
Outstanding Issues
Overview of PK Workshop - Purpose, Major
Issues, Conclfisions
Summary of Scientific Issues and
Discussions Pg Workshop
Don DeVincenzi
ARC
HP (Chuck) Klein
Mary Lynn Perille-Collins
U Wisconsin
Milwaukee
4:30
5:15
Antarctic Research Findings Pertinent to
Mars/Planetary Protection Issues
ADJOURN
Diana Freckman
U California
Riverside
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Day 2 - Tuesday. September 10. 1991
8:00 - 9:00 a.m. BREAKFAST - BECKMAN CENTER REFECTORY
8;00 _.8;45 Optlo,a! VieW!rig ""L|fe ifi Ice"
Roo_]!,_
[ [
9:00 "MARS THE PLANET" Michael Carr
USGS
Bob Pepin
Univ Minnesota
Mars Science Working Group Activities
Concerning Forward and Back Contamination
Michael Carr
Surface Temperatures Michael Cart
Radiation Types and Flux at the Surface Jim Gooding
JSC
Soil Chemistry Ben Clark
Martin Marietta
Mars Meterorites Jay Melosh
Lunar & Planetary Lab
12:00 p.m. LUNCH - BECKMAN CENTER REFECTORY
12:!5 _ ii00 Optionai :Viewing _'Life in ice. IRoom II"D ......
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1:00 *LIFE IN EXTREME ENVIRONMENTS"
Low Water Stress
Stability Relations of Water
Low Temperature Stress
Low Pressure (Vacuum) Stress
UV and Radiation Stress
Sporulation and Resting Forms and the
Survival Capacity
Detection of Nucleic Acids
5:30 ADJOURN
Ken Nealson
Larry Hochstein
ARC
Bruce Jakosky
Univ of Colorado
Art Yayanos
Scripps
TBD
Richard Setlow
Brookhaven Ntl Lab
Philipp Gerhardt
Michigan State
Tom Schmidt
Miami Univ
6:30 COCKTAILS AND DINNER - BECKMAN CENTER PATIO
Day 3, Wednesday. Seetember 11. 1991
8:00 - 9:00 a.m. BREAKFAST - BECKMAN CENTER REFECTORY
9:00 a.m.
9:45
Current Scientific and Technological Issues
Associated With Sample Return Missions
Alternative Sterilization Methods
Roger Bourke
JPL
Bob Howell
Bionetics Corp
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10:30
11:15
12:00
Societal Issues Associated with Planetary
Protection/Back Contamination
Legal/Regulatory Issues Associated with
Planetary Protection
Discussion and Wrap-Up
Idargaret Race
UC Berkeley
George Robinson
Smithsonian
Ken Nealson
Chairman
12:30 LUNCH - BECKMAN CENTER REFECTORY
1:15 p.m.
5:00
EXECUTIVE SESSION
Discussion of Workshop Presentations, Review of Report Outline,
Writing Assignments
Writing Session
ADJOURN
Day 4. 1991. Thursday, _;¢ptember 12. 1991
8:00 - 9:00 a.m. BREAKFAST - BECKMAN CENTER REFECTORY
9:00 Plenary Session - Discussion of Writing Assignments and Identification
of Issues and Problems
9:30 Writing Sessions
12:00 p.m. LUNCH - BECKMAN CENTER REFECTORY
4:00 Plenary Session - Review Progress, NASA Request,
and Task Group Charge
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5:00 ADJOURN
4_ * I I, * II l, * * II III Ik _ Ik Ik iII I I
Day 5. Friday. Sentember 13. 1991
g:00 - 9:00 a.m. BREAKFAST - BECKMAN CENTER REFECTORY
9:00 Writing Sessions
12:00 p.m. LUNCH - BECKMAN CENTER REFECTORY
1:00 Plenary Session - Review of Report, Identification of Outstanding Issues
Additional Assignments, Determine Schedule for Completion of Report,
Identify Future Meeting Dates
3:00 ADJOURN
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WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS
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of Wisconsin
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Diana Freckman, Department of Nematology, University of California
Philipp Gerhardt, Department of Microbiology and Public Health, Michigan
State University
Robert Howell, Bionetics Corporation, NASA Ames Research Center
Bruce Jakosky, Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space Physics, University
of Colorado
Harold P. Klein, Biology Division, Santa Clara University
Jay Melosh, Lunar and Planetary Laboratory, University of Arizona
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WORKSHOP PRESENTATIONS AND RESOURCE MATERIALS
Presentations
NASA Planetary Protection Policy and Future Mars Mission Requirements--
Review of the NASA Request, presentation by John D. Rummel, Plan-
etary Protection Officer, NASA Headquarters, September 9, 1991
Historical Perspective and Some Issues Pertinent to Planetary Protection
Policy, presentation by Harold P. Klein, Santa Clara University, Septem-
ber 9, 1991
NASA Planetary Protection Policy and Implementation, John D. Rummel,
Planetary Protection Officer, NASA Headquarters, September 9, 1991
NASA Mars Exploration Planning (Code SL), Joseph M. Boyce, NASA
Headquarters, September 9, 1991
NASA SEI Mars Exploration Planning (Code RZ), Lewis L. Peach, Office
of Exploration, September 9, 1991
European Science Community Perspectives on Planetary Protection, presen-
tation by Claudia Lindberg, Institute for Aerospace Medicine, DLR, KOln,
Germany, September 9, 1991
USSR Mars Planning, presentation by Michail Ivanov, USSR Academy of
Sciences, September 9, 1991
APPENDIX C 79
A Summary of the NASA Workshop on Planetary Protection Issues and
Future Mars Missions, Donald L. DeVincenzi, NASA Ames Research
Center, September 9, 1991
Overview of Probability of Growth (Pg) Workshop--Purpose, Major Issues,
Conclusions, presentation by Harold P. Klein, Santa Clara University,
September 9, 1991
Mars Surface Temperatures, presentation by Michael Carr, September 10,
1991
Biogeochemical Information About Mars Inferred from SNC Meteorites,
presentation by James L. Gooding, Code SN/Solar System Exploration
Division, NASA Johnson Space Center, September 10, 1991
Mars Soil Chemistry, presentation by Benton Clark, Martin Marietta, Den-
ver, Colorado, September 10, 1991
Stability of Water and Ice on Mars, presentation by Bruce M. Jakosky,
Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space Physics, University of Colorado,
September 10, 1991
UV and Radiation Stress, presentation by Richard B. Setlow, Brookhaven
National Laboratory, September 10, 1991
Sporulation and Resting Forms and the Survival Capacity, written presenta-
tion by Philipp Gerhardt, Michigan State University, September 10, 1991
Detection of Nucleic Acids and Citations Indicating the Inadequacy of Mi-
croscopic and Culture Methods for Describing Microbial Communities,
presentation by Thomas Schmidt, September 10, 1991
Scientific and Technological Issues Associated with Sample Return Mis-
sions, presentation by Roger D. Bourke, Manager, Exploration Initiative
Studies Office, Jet Propulsion Laboratory, September 11, 1991
Alternative Sterilization Methods, presentation by Robert Howell, Bionetics
Corporation, September 11, 1991
Societal Issues Associated with Planetary Protection and Back Contamina-
tion, presentation by Margaret Race, University of California, Berkeley,
September 11, 1991
Exobiology and Planetary Protection--The Evolving Law, presentation by
George S. Robinson, Smithsonian Institution, September 11, 1991
Papers Cited
"Action Spectra for Survival and Spore Photoproduct Formation of Bacillus
subtilis Irradiated with Short-Wavelength (200-300 nm) UV at Atmo-
spheric Pressure and in Vacuo" (J. Photochem. Photobiol. B:Biol.l 1:69-
80, June 7, 1991) C. Lindberg and G. Horneck, K61n, Germany
"Can Spores Survive in Interstellar Space?" (Nature 316:403-407, August
1985), Peter Weber and Mayo Greenberg, Laboratory of Astrophysics,
University of Leiden, 2313 A.V. Leiden, The Netherlands
80 APPENDIX C
"Ejection of Rock Fragments from Planetary Bodies" (Geology, pp. 144-
148, February 1985), H. Jay Melosh, Lunary and Planetary Laboratory,
University of Arizona
"Evolutional and Ecological Implications of the Properties of Deep-Sea
Barophilic Bacteria" (Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 83:9542-9546, Decem-
ber 1986), A. Aristides Yayanos, Scripps Institution of Oceanography,
University of California
"First Biological and Dosimetric Results of the Free Flyer Biostack Experi-
ment A0015 on LDEF," G. Reitz, H. Bucker, R. Facius, G. Horneck, M.
Schafer, and J.U. Schott, DLR, FF-ME, Biophysics Division, Linder Hohe,
5000 K61n 90, Germany
"Ionizing Radiation at the Surface of Mars" (unpublished paper), James L.
Gooding and Gautaum D. Badhwar, September 10, 1991
"The Large Crater Origin of SNC Meteorites" (Science 237:738-743, Au-
gust 14, 1987), A.M. Vickery and H.J. Melosh
"Long-Term Exposure of Bacterial Spores to Space" (submitted to Nature),
G. Horneck, H. Bucker, G. Reitz, Institute for Aerospace Medicine, DLR,
Linder Hohe, 5000 KOln 90, Germany
"The Rocky Road to Panspermia" (Nature 332:6166, April 21, 1988), Jay
Melosh, Lunar and Planetary Laboratory, University of Arizona
"Spore Thermoresistance Mechanisms" (Chapter 2 from Regulation of Procary-
otic Development, American Society for Microbiology, Washington, D.C.,
1989), Philipp Gerhardt and Robert E. Marquis
Other Resource Materials
DeVincenzi, D.L., H.P. Klein, and J. Bagby. 1991. Planetary Protection
Issues and Future Mat's Missions. NASA Ames Research Center, Moffett
Field, Calif.
"European Space Report," Policy Issues in East and West, Volume 2, Num-
ber 14, n.d.
Excerpts from Recommendations on Quarantine Policy for Mars, Jupiter,
Saturn, Uranus, Neptune, and Titan, Committee on Planetary Biology
and Chemical Evolution, Space Science Board, National Research Coun-
cil, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C., 1978
Klein, H.P. 1991. Planetary Protection Issues for the MESUR Mission:
Probability of Growth (Pg). NASA conference publication. NASA Ames
Research Center, Moffett Field, Calif.
"Mars Environmental Survey (MESUR)," NASA informational brochure,
n.d.
"Marsnet--A Mars Network of Surface Stations" (unpublished white pa-
per), G.E.N., Scoon, ESA/ESTEC, n.d.
APPENDIX C 81
Mazur, Peter. 1980. "Limits to Life at Low Temperatures and at Reduced
Water Contents and Water Activities." Origins Life 10:137-159.
Revised Planetary Protection Policy, presentation by D. DeVincenzi to Space
Science Board, October 10, 1985
Spaceflight Environmental Effects Newsletter, Special Issue, Volume 1, Number
5, August 10, 1990
"The Viking Mission and the Question of Life on Mars," Journal of Mo-
lecular Evolution, 14, Numbers 1-3, 1979
DExcerpts from the 1978 Report*
*Reprinted from Space Science Board, National Research Council. 1978. Recommendations
on Quarantine Policy fi_r Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus, Neptune, and Titan. National Acad-
emy of Sciences, Washington, D.C.
82
APPENDIX D 83
2
Recommendations on Quarantine
Policy for Mars Based on the Current
Viking Findings
The current NASA policy on the likelihood of growth of terrestrial
microorganisms on Mars is based on the December 14, 1970, Space
Science Board report, Review of Sterilization Parameter Probability
of Growth (Pg).
The report established the minimum conditions necessary to de-
fine a microenvironment on Mars that would support growth of the
most "hardy terrestrial organisms." The conditions established were
the following:
(a) Water activity (aw) 1>0.95.
(b) Temperature >_0°C for at least 0.5 h/day.
(c) Nutrients: At least small amounts of water-soluble nitrogen,
sulfur, phosphorus, carbon (and/or light), pH values between 5
and 8.
(d) Attenuation of uv flux by more than 10 3 .
(e) Antinutrients-absence of antimetabolites.
All the above, conditions must occur simultaneously, or nearly so.
The report then proceeded to estimate the value of Pg, the "esti-
mated probability that growth and spreading of terrestrial organisms
on the planet surface will occur." The estimated value of Pg was
3 X 10 -9, with less than one chance in a thousand that it exceeded
1 × 10- 4. For the Viking project, NASA adopted a value of Pg =
10-6, some three orders of magnitude more favorable to growth than
the best estimate of the review committee, but still two orders of
magnitude less than the extreme upper limit. The adoption of this
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value required terminal heat sterilization of the entire Viking Lander
but not of the Orbiter. The value remains NASA policy to date.
I. VIKING FINDINGS PERTINENT TO QUARANTINE
Estimating the likelihood of the growth of terrestrial organisms on
Mars requires a comparison between the known physical and chem-
ical limits to terrestrial growth and the known and inferred condi-
tions present on or just below the Martian surface. Table I makes
that comparison in abbreviated form. Appendix A discusses in fuller
form the inferences that can be drawn from the Viking findings
about those physical and chemical characteristics of the Martian sur-
face that are pertinent to the question of the growth of terrestrial
microorganisms.
Orbital measurements have covered appreciable fractions of the
planet's surface, but the two Landers (VL-I and VL-2) have sampled
only a few square meters of the surface at two subpolar sites. The
biologically relevant experiments were conducted on soil samples
acquired during the Martian summer and early fall from as deep as
6 cm below the surface. (In March 1977 a sample was acquired from
a depth of 20 cm, but as of April 1977 an inorganic analysis is the
only experiment that has been performed.) Nevertheless, certain
extrapolations relevant to the quarantine question can be made with
various degrees of confidence to other regions of the planet, to great-
er depths, and to other seasons of the year.
TABLE 1 Limits for Growth of Terrestrial Organisms
Factor 1970 Study Refs. 2 and 3 Conditions on Mars a
Water activity (a w) >_0.95 >0.9
Water (liquid) - Required
Temperature _0°C >-15_C
pH 5-8 <11,5
Ultraviolet radiation b 0,1 J cm -2
Ionizing radiation b - 2-4 Mrad
Nutrients See text and Refs. 2 and 3
Antimetabolites None present
0tol
Not detected
+20 to -143°C (see text)
Not known
0.04 J cm -2 rain -l
<500 rad/yr c
Organic compounds _<ppb;
most required elements
detected (see text) d
Strong oxidants present
(see text) d
a c
• Cf, Reference 1; uv flux data from Referen e 18.
0Limit for survival. Limits for growth are not known.
See p. 11.
At VL-1 and VL-2 sites.
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II. CONCLUSIONS ON THE LIKELIHOOD OF THE GROWTH
OF TERRESTRIAL ORGANISMS ON MARS
We turn now to a reassessment of Pg, the likelihood of the growth of
terrestrial organisms on Mars. We will consider three regions sepa-
rately: (1)subpolar areas within a few centimeters of the surface,
(2) subpolar regions more than a few centimeters below the surface,
and (3) the residual polar caps. Finally, we will discuss briefly the
likelihood that terrestrial organisms could survive transport at or
above the surface from one region to another.
A. Subpolar Regions within about 6 Centimeters of the Surface
Our conclusion is that no terrestrial organisms could grow within a
few centimeters of the surface in the regions lying between the two
residual polar caps. We base this judgment on the following of the
Viking findings:
- The presence in VL-1 and VL-2 sample of strong oxidants.
- The absence of detectable organic compounds, which (a) attests
to the power of the oxidants and (b) renders unlikely the existence
of the specific types of organic compounds required for terrestrial
heterotrophic organisms.
- The inability of physical shielding by a rock to eliminate the
oxidants.
Our conclusion is reinforced by three additional factors that were
well known before the mission:
- The unlikelihood of organisms being deposited in regions that
receive sufficient visible light to support photosynthetic autotrophy
without at the same time receiving lethal fluxes of ultraviolet radi-
ation.*
- The exceedingly low probability for the existence of liquid
water with activity (aw) high enough to support terrestrial growth.
- The fact that, even if liquid water were present, vegetative cells
would be subjected to daily cycles of injurious freezing; and only
vegetative cells can grow.
*Although unlikely, the probability is not zero. Sagan and Pollack t o have cal-
culated that, although the try flux is attenuated several millionfold at 0.8 cm
below the Martian surface, the flux of visible light would still be 3.8 x 10 2 erg
cm -2 sec -t at that depth.
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It is highly likely that the surface conditions enumerated above at
the VL-! and VL-2 sites prevail over the subpolar regions of the
planet. This conclusion is based on
I. The similarity in the findings at two widely separated points
for the elemental composition of the regolith and for the results of
the organic analysis and the gas-exchange experiments.
2. The strong probability that the oxidants are derived from
atmospheric reactions or atmosphere-regolith reactions. Accord-
ingly, it is difficult to conceive of regions that would be accessible to
terrestrial microorganisms and at the same time be capable of exclud-
ing the atmosphere.
3. The fact that the Infrared Thermal Mapper (IRTM) has mapped
a sizable fraction of the Martian surface without detecting thermal
heterogeneities significantly more favorable to terrestrial growth than
those that we have reviewed in Appendix A.
Viking has provided much information that was either not known
beforehand or was known only with considerable uncertainty. None
of this new information suggests that the Martian surface is less harsh
to terrestrial microorganisms than was thought prior to Viking.* On
the other hand, two pieces of information indicate that it is harsher
than was thought previously: the lack of detectable organic com-
pounds and the presence of strong oxidants even in regions physical-
ly shielded from uv.
Our conclusion is that no terrestrial organism could grow under
the conditions found by Viking to prevail on subpolar surfaces at the
landing sites and none could grow under the conditions that are
highly likely to prevail throughout the entire subpolar region. Few if
any terrestrial organisms could grow in contact with even one of the
adverse conditions cited, much less grow when exposed to all of
them simultaneously. Although we cannot absolutely rule out the
existence of oases capable of supporting terrestrial life, we believe,
for the reasons cited, that the likelihood of their existence is ex-
tremely low.
Unfortunately, we know of no quantitative basis for assigning a
numerical probability to "extremely low" when no oasis has been
*The demonstration by Viking that the atmosphere contains nitrogen answers
an important question that was unknown previously. However, the ignorance
prior to Viking of the existence of nitrogen was not a significant factor in prior
estimates of the probability of growth of terrestrial organisms.
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detected and when the weight of evidence is that none can exist. And
yet a numerical value for Pg is required in order to determine what
procedures are needed to reduce the microbial burden on future
spacecraft to Mars to levels that fulfill current COSPAR quarantine
policy. Reluctantly, then, we recommend for these purposes, and
these purposes alone, that NASA adopt a value ofPg < 10 -1 o for the
subpolar regions of the planet within 6 cm of the surface. * This
number, which is more than four orders of magnitude below the
current value of Pg, reflects the fact that Viking has found the condi-
tions to be considerably harsher to terrestrial life than was heretofore
assumed and has obtained evidence that renders the existence of
oases far less likely than was heretofore assumed.
B. Regions More than 6 Centimeters below the Surface of Subpolar
Regions
As mentioned, Viking conducted biology experiments and organic
analysis on samples obtained from depths of 4-6 cm. Greater depths
would be required to reduce or eliminate the lethal surface condi-
tions. The depths required are unknown chiefly because the relation
between depth and the presence of oxidants is unknown. However,
the maximum temperature falls rapidly with depth. In the northern
hemisphere, even at a depth of 4 cm, the maximum temperature is
estimated to be 20 ° below the minimum confirmed growth tempera-
tures (-15 °) observed for terrestrial organisms (Appendix B). By a
depth of 24 cm, the maximum temperature is estimated to be -50°C,
some 35 ° below the minimum confirmed terrestrial growth tempera-
ture. In the southern hemisphere, the maximum temperature at a
depth of 24 cm is estimated to be -35°C, still 20 ° below the mini-
mum terrestrial growth temperature: ,8
At increased depths there is an increased likelihood of encounter-
ing ice, the existence of which would enhance the possibility of
liquid water. But water that is liquid below -20°C and is in equilib-
rium with ice has an activity (aw) below that which will support the
*We obtain this value by estimating probabilities of < 10 -2 for the presence of
liquid water of high enough aw, < 10 -l for the ability to survive multiple freez-
ing and thawing, < 10 -1 for the avoidance of lethal uv, << lO -2 for the presence
of organic compounds of appropriate types in appropriate concentrations,
<< lO -a for the absence of powerful oxidants, and 0.1 that the deposited micro-
organism is an anaerobe.
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growth of any known terrestrial organism capable of growing under
the partial pressure of oxygen on Mars (Appendix B, Figure B.2). 9
Thus, temperature alone seems an absolute barrier to the growth
of any terrestrial organisms at depths below a few tenths of a meter.
But again, sufficient uncertainties exist to preclude an absolute state-
ment to this effect; viz.,
- Although the surface temperatures are derived directly from
the orbital infrared measurements and are consistent with the direct
meteorological measurements at the landing sites 1.5 m above the
surface, the estimates of subsurface temperatures require assump-
tions about the thermal diffusivity of the soil. The range of error is
estimated by Kieffer a to be 5°C. This error would not be sufficient
to change our conclusions, but larger errors are conceivable.
- There could exist heterogeneities below the resolving power of
the IRTM (a minimum of 2 km) that have higher temperatures.
- Although there is extensive information on the minimum
growth temperatures of terrestrial microorganisms, the remote pos-
sibility exists that some unknown organism has a growth minimum
below - 15°C. We view this as extremely remote because, as indicated
in Appendix B, the number of species capable of growth diminishes
drastically as the temperature is lowered below 0°C. Furthermore,
growth below -15°C is tantamount to growth in f>8 osmolal solute,
conditions that even at ordinary temperatures preclude the growth of
all except halophiles and osmophiles.
- There is the remote possibility that there exists somewhere a
narrow zone of subsurface that is deep enough to preclude oxidants
and shallow enough to have temperatures high enough to support
growth.
Although these uncertainties prevent us from concluding that the
possibility for growth is zero, we are still forced to conclude that
subsurfaces of Mars are exceedingly harsh for terrestrial life. Accord-
ingly, for the specific purpose of determining quarantine require-
ments for future Martian missions, we recommend that NASA adopt
a value of Pg < 10 -a for subsurfaces in the subpolar regions of the
planet.
C. The Residual Polar Caps
The arguments just presented for subsurface regions generally apply
to the residual polar caps as well. As in the subsurface regions, the
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temperatures mapped by the IRTM are too low to permit the growth
of known terrestrial organisms. However, thermal heterogeneities
have been detected. The maximum temperatures observed (237 K)
are not high enough to permit the growth of earth organisms, but
their presence raises the remote possibility that there exist other
undetected heterogeneities for which the temperature does rise high
enough. But warmer regions will also be drier regions, because the
increased vapor pressure associated with higher temperatures would
cause water to distill rapidly from these regions and freeze out at the
cold trap furnished by the remainder of the residual cap. 4 The water
ice itself in the residual caps constitutes a possible source of liquid
water, provided that special conditions were present to permit that
ice to liquefy rather than to sublime (e.g., freezing point depression
by electrolytes). But even then, as in the case of subsurfaces, the
temperatures would be too low to permit the growth of terrestrial
organisms.
The polar regions would not be immune from the atmospheric
oxidants, but chemical interactions between atmosphere and ice
might be different from chemical interactions between atmosphere
and regolith.
Our conclusions about the likelihood of growth in the residual
polar caps are similar to those reached in Section B above for sub-
surface subpolar regions-it is extremely low. Nevertheless, because
there is more uncertainty about the physical and chemical conditions
at the residual polar caps, we believe that these regions should be
handled with prudence and recommend that they be assigned a value
of Pg < 10 -7.
D° Transport from Subpolar Regions into the Residual Polar Caps
or into Putative Oases
There is little likelihood that any terrestrial organism could survive a
voyage on or above the surface requiring more than a few minutes.
First, the uv flux on the surface of Mars is 4 X I0 -2 J cm -2 min -_ ,
and that flux would kill the most resistant of terrestrial microorgan-
isms in a few minutes (upper terrestrial limit 0.1 J/cm 2) (Table 1).
Second, organisms protected from the direct exposure to the uv by a
layer of soil particles would nevertheless be in contact with the oxi-
dants in those soil particles.
One consequence of these lethal conditions is that our recom-
mended value of <10 -7 for Pg in the residual polar caps applies only
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to terrestrial organisms that are released directly in that region. The
Pg for organisms transported into the polar caps from the subpolar
regions would be orders of magnitude lower. Similarly, even if Mars
were to possess oases that were hospitable to terrestrial life, few if
any terrestrial organisms would survive a surface or aerial trip to the
oasis and few if any would ever survive an escape from the oasis.
III. LIMITS TO THE GROWTH OF TERRESTRIAL LIFE VERSUS
THE QUESTION OF INDIGENOUS LIFE ON MARS
The evidence that leads us to the conclusion that terrestrial micro-
organisms have little and in most regions of the planet no probability
of growth does not rule out the possibility that indigenous life forms
may exist currently on Mars or may have existed sometime in the
past. The limiting conditions listed in Table 2 for terrestrial life are
not the limits for conceivable life elsewhere.
There is fairly wide agreement that life, if it exists elsewhere, is
based on carbon chemistry and that it requires nitrogen; organic
compounds of high information content, energy, and substrates to
permit the synthesis of the organic compounds; and liquid water.
Although, as discussed, organic compounds and liquid water have not
been detected on Mars, there is no basis for precluding their exist-
ence. There is, moreover, strong evidence that liquid water in large
quantities existed in the Martian past.
It might be argued that, if indigenous life forms do exist, they
themselves could constitute micro-oases for the growth of terrestrial
organisms. We consider this unlikely. For example, a Martian organ-
ism growing in thermal equilibrium with its surroundings at -40°C
would be of no value to a terrestrial organism incapable of growing
below 0°C. A Martian organism that maintains its temperature at 0°C
even when the external temperature is -40°C is conceivable. How-
ever, to do so, a spherical organism 2 × 10-4 cm in diameter, for
example, encased in efficient insulation i> 1 mm thick would have to
assimilate and burn about 1000 times its steady-state concentration
of organic compounds per second to maintain the 40-degree dif-
ferential. The problem would be only slightly less serious in a macro-
scopic Martian organism. Analogous difficulties arise in postulating
that the organic compounds in putative Martian biota would be com-
patible with and utilizable by the enzyme systems of terrestrial
microorganisms.
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TABLE 2 Estimated Contributions to Pg for Jupiter and Saturn
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Factor Jupiter Report Uranus Report Comments
Temperature 1 1
Pressure 1 1
Radiation 1 Not specified
but <1
Liquid H 2 O 1 1
Nutrients 10-1 <10 -a a
Anaerobiosis 10 -I 10 -l
NH 3 toxicity 10 -2 < 10 --4 b
Growth in aerosols Not specified <10 -3a
Convection to 10 -3 <10 -a
lethal temperatures
TOTALS 10 -7 <10-14
Assumed between -20
to 100°C
Not a critical parameter
for microbiology
Deleterious
Assumed
Organics, ions -- aqueous
solution
About 0.10 of the
earth's microbes are
anaerobes, but these
are unlikely to be
spacecraft contam-
inants
Completion of life
cycle in the atmo-
sphere has never been
reported for any
earth organisms
All models predict that
organisms will be car-
ried from water levels
to lethal depths; the
times required are
somewhat model
dependent
a 23
. Based on more detailed analyses. '
t)New information, e.g., Reference 22.
IV. CONCLUSIONS PERTINENT TO THE CURRENT VIKING
ORBITERS
As of August 1977, two years have elapsed since the unsterilized
Orbiters were launched from earth. Any organisms on the outer sur-
face of the Orbiter have surely been killed by uv irradiation. Most
organisms in the interior of the Orbiter have been subjected to mod-
erate temperatures (10 to 38°C), high vacuum, and some ionizing
radiation? _ Although the cell dehydration associated with the high
92 APPENDIX D
vacuum would be lethal to a fraction of the microbial population,
many (perhaps 1 to 10 percent) would likely survive. 6 '_ 2,t 3 Some
protons from galactic cosmic rays and solar flares would strike organ-
isms in the interior, but the dose would be appreciably less than 500
rad/year, _1'14 and many microorganisms can survive such doses.
(The flux of solar protons far exceeds that from galactic source, but
the great bulk of the solar protons have energies of _ 1 MeV,' _ and
such protons are only capable of penetrating _<0.1 mm of material
with a density o.f 1, e.g., water? 4) Conservatively, then, one cannot
assume that the microbial burden within the Orbiter has decreased
by more than 1 or 2 orders of magnitude since launch.
In spite of the expected survival of a fraction of the original bur-
den of terrestrial microorganisms, our new estimates of the values of
Pg lead to the conclusion that COSPAR requirements for planetary
quarantine will not be compromised by lowering the periapsis of the
Orbiters to 300 km. Indeed, with the new values for Pg, still lower
periapses for unsterilized Martian orbiters may well be compatible
with COSPAR requirements. NASA will probably wish to determine
these minimum orbital altitudes before assessing and designing Mars
follow-on missions in detail.
V. QUARANTINE STRATEGY FOR FUTURE MISSIONS TO
THE MARTIAN SURFACE
Our Committee has recommended that the next phase in the biolog-
ical exploration of Mars should be to acquire and characterize soil
samples from areas likely to contain sediments and ice-regolith inter-
faces, t Locating these areas and locating sites that are shielded from
the powerful atmospheric ultraviolet radiation and the powerful sur-
face oxidants will require subsurface sampling by a soft lander, by
penetrators, or by both. The samples acquired from the subsurface of
Mars should be characterized with respect to organic compounds,
carbon and sulfur isotope ratios, the amount and state of water, the
presence of water-soluble electrolytes, and the existence of non-
equilibrium gas compositions. The greater the extent to which sam-
ples possess these characteristics the greater the priority for the initi-
ation of a second phase of post-Viking biological exploration of
Mars-a detailed search for evidence of present or past life on Martian
samples returned to earth.
With respect to quarantine considerations for the mission that
conducts the first exploratory phase, our estimates for the values of
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Pg lead to the conclusion that terminal heat sterilization would not
be required in the case of a nominal soft landing in the subpolar
regions (Section A) and possibly in other cases as well. However, we
would have no objections to sterilization provided that it has no
impact on the scientific payload of the landers and that it does not
increase the mission cost. (We have been informed by representatives
of NASA that this may be the case.) Decisions on scientific payloads
for the missions should be based on their scientific quality and cost
effectiveness. ICe wouM ob/ect to the elimination of an experiment
or the degradation of its performance because of the imposition of
unessential sterilization requirements.
In the report Post-Fiking Biological Investigations of Mars, _ we
stated that we consider metabolic-type life-detection experiments on
the surface of Mars to be of low priority scientifically. Nevertheless,
NASA may decide to include them. If so, a limiting factor with
respect to the allowable microbial burden on a soft lander would
likely become the avoidance of contaminating the metabolic experi-
ment by terrestrial microorganisms.
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Appendix A:
Findings from Viking Pertinent to the
Possible Growth of Terrestrial
Microorganisms on Mars"
I. DEFINITIVE FINDINGS FROM VIKING
A. Water
The gas chromatograph-mass spectrometer (GCMS) has detected less
than 0.1 percent water in soil samples (several tenths of a percent in
one sample collected from beneath a rock). The current belief is that
this water represents mineral hydrate water of moderate or low ther-
mal stability. Neither this instrument nor the others on the lander
were designed to detect free liquid water, nor have they done so.
Unfortunately, Viking carried no instrument to measure relative
humidity. However, indirect evidence (e.g., cloud formation) indi-
cates that saturation does occur in the atmosphere.
The probability for the existence of liquid water anywhere on the
planet remains low. The surface temperatures and atmospheric pres-
sures preclude the existence of pure bulk liquid water under equilib-
rium conditions. However, there continue to be three remote pos-
sibilities for the existence of liquid water: (1) water adsorbed to
subsoil, (2) water that is liquid by virtue of kinetic factors slowing
the approach to equilibrium (i.e., conditions under which diffusion
of water is slower than diffusion of heat), and (3) water that has its
chemical potential (and hence freezing point) lowered by the pres-
ence of dissolved solutes. The solutes could be one or more of the
several salts that are almost certainly present. The eutectic points of
*Pertinent references not cited here will be found in Reference 1.
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salts like CaCI_ MgC12, and K2CO3 are below -30°C; hence their
presence would permit stable liquid water down to these tempera-
tures. The electrolyte concentrations, however, would be multimolar.
Another argument against the existence of liquid water at the
landing sites is the findings of the Labelled Release and Gas Ex-
change biology experiments. In both cases, the initial addition of
water vapor or liquid water to the soil samples dissipated the re-
actants so that further additions produced no further reactions (re-
lease of 14 CO2 and release of oxygen in the two experiments, respec-
tively). Presumably, therefore, no reactions at all would have been
observed if the soil itself had been exposed to high-activity liquid
water just prior to the acquisition of samples by the Landers.
B. Temperature
The maximum temperatures Observed at the surface of the landing
sites during the summer-autumn observation period were -2 to
-3°C. This is below the minimum growth temperature of most ter-
restrial microorganisms, although, as discussed later and in Appendix
B, a few terrestrial organisms can grow at temperatures as low as
-14°C. In the southern hemisphere of Mars, the maximum summer
surface temperatures may reach 20°C?
At night, even in summer, the temperature drops to _-83°C. Dry
bacterial and funsal spores could survive many cycles of such freez-
ing, but hydrated and germinated spores or vegetative cells of most
terrestrial species could not. s-7 And any terrestrial microorganism
that is to grow on Mars must by definition be in the vegetative state
to carry out such growth.
C. Lack of Detected Organic Compounds
No organic compounds other than traces attributable to terrestrial
contaminants have been detected in regolith samples analyzed by the
GCMS. If volatizable organic compounds were present in the sam-
ples, they were either present in concentrations below the parts per
billion range (the detection limit of the instrument) or they were
totally restricted to substances like methane with molecular weights
of less than 18, which were undetectable or detectable only at re-
duced sensitivities.
The inability to detect organic compounds does not, of course,
prove that none was present. But even if trace amounts of organic
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compounds are in fact present in the soil of the landing sites, the
probability is remote that these would provide a nutrient medium
that could be used by terrestrial microorganisms (see Reference 3 for
further discussion).
D. Elemental
The biologically vital element nitrogen has now been shown to be in
the Martian atmosphere. Calcium, sulfur, magnesium, chlorine, and
probably potassium and phosphorus have also been detected in soil
samples. All six are essential to terrestrial living systems. Instrument
limitations precluded the detection of sodium, but there is no reason
to believe that it is not present, although probably only in low con-
centrations.
One striking finding is that the elemental composition of the sam-
ples was nearly identical at the two widely separated landing sites. 26
This similarity indicates that the fine-grained material in at least the
upper surfaces of the regolith has been thoroughly mixed over large
regions of the planet-presumably as the result of wind action) _
E. Oxidants
Two lines of evidence indicate that strong oxidants are present in at
least the top few centimeters of the regolith at the landing sites. The
first line of evidence comes from orbital measurements of the atmo-
sphere and from modeling. One model predicts the existence of
active strongly oxidizing species, especially hydrogen peroxide:
Second, the gas-exchange experiment (GEX) on the Viking landers
showed the release of up to nearly a micromole of oxygen when
samples were humidified with water and warmed to - 10°C.
The GEX experiment suggests that oxidants are present to at least
the 4-6-cm depth from which samples were acquired. The experi-
ment also showed that the oxidants were present in samples collected
from beneath a rock, a rock that presumably had laid undisturbed
for many years. Finally, the experiment showed that the oxidants
were present at both landing sites) a
The oxidants are believed to be responsible for the lack of detect-
able organic compounds, i.e., they have decomposed them.
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II. EXTRAPOLATION FROM THE VIKING FINDINGS TO THE
PLANET'S SURFACE AS A WHOLE, TO REGIONS BELOW
THE SURFACE, AND TO OTHER SEASONS OF THE YEAR
Surface temperatures in the Martian winter will drop far lower than
those experienced during the Lander experiments. Estimates from
the infrared thermal mapper (IRTM) indicate that the maximum
surface temperature will fall below -15°C (the minimal terrestrial
growth temperature-see Appendix B) for more than half the Martian
year at the VL-2 site (48 ° N) and further north. At VL-I (22 ° N) the
maximum surface temperature will just about reach -15°C in the
winter, g (Orbital IRTM measurements during winter will become
available during the ensuing months.)
In considering extrapolations from the findings of VL-I and VL-2
on surface chemistry, we note that, although the two landing sites
(22 ° N and 48 ° N) are separated by some 1500 km in latitude and
176 degrees in longitude, the results of the gas-exchange (GEX) and
labeled release (LR) biology experiments and of the organic and
inorganic analyses at the two sites were either similar or essentially
identical.* Strong similarities were evident as well from the imaging
experiment and from the atmospheric analyses. As noted, the results
of the GEX, LR, and GCMS experiments are consistent with the
presence of powerful oxidants in the surface samples. Since these
oxidants are almost certainly derived from atmospheric photochem-
ical reactions or from chemical reactions between atmospheric
species and the regolith, there is every reason to expect that they will
be globally distributed in the Martian surface, except possibly in the
residual polar caps.
Certain extrapolation can also be made to depths below the 4-6
cm sampled by the Landers.
A. Water
Several Viking experiments have confirmed or strengthened the in-
ference that large amounts of water are locked beneath the surface in
the form of ice. Subsurface liquid water is conceivable; however,
*Samples from the two sites in the Pyrolytic Release (PR) experiment, however,
responded differently to the addition of water vapor. 2 s The experimenters sug-
gest that this reflects differences in the properties of the soil at the two sites, but
they draw no inferences as to the nature and degree of the differences.
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because of the low temperatures at subsurfaces (see below), the exist-
ence of liquid water in an equilibrium state would require multimolar
concentrations of electrolytes (see Appendix B, Table B. l).
B. Temperature
The maximum summer temperatures some 6 cm below the surface at
the VL-1 and VL-2 sites are estimated from the IRTM measurements
to be -35°C. s This temperature is 20 ° below the minimum con-
firmed growth temperature for terrestrial microorganisms. It is even
below the lowest growth temperature ever claimed in published re-
ports. At a depth of 24 cm, the maximum summer temperatures at
the VL-I and VL-2 sites are estimated to be -50°C, or 35 ° below the
minimum confirmed terrestrial growth temperature. In the southern
hemisphere as a result of the eccentricity of the Martian orbit, the
maximum surface temperatures between latitudes 5° and 45 ° are
about 15 ° warmer than at the present landing sites. As a result, at
subsurface depths sufficient to damp out diurnal variations, the max-
imum summer temperature is calculated to be about -35°C, still
some 20 ° below the minimum confirmed terrestrial growth tem-
perature. 4
C. Ultraviolet Light
As shown in Table 1, the flux of ultraviolet radiation impinging on
the Martian surface would be rapidly lethal to any terrestrial organ-
ism. However, the uv flux is sharply attenuated below the surface.
For example, Sagan and Pollack I 0 estimate an attenuation of several
millionfold at a depth of 0.8 cm.
D. Oxidants and Organic Compounds
Since the oxidants in the regolith are almost certainly derived from
atmospheric processes, their concentrations ought to diminish with
depth below the surface. But the relationship between depth and
concentration is unknown. Presumably at least some of the oxidant
species are diffusable, for they were present in the soil samples col-
lected from beneath the rock at the VL-2 site.
Since the lack of detectable organic compounds within 4-6 cm of
the surface seems due to the presence of the oxidants, the likelihood
of organic compounds ought to increase with depth. (Organic matter
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must be present at least transiently on the Martian surface, if from
no other source than the infall of carbonaceous chondrites.)
Although the Martian surface is strikingly similar at two widely
separated points when viewed close-up from the two Landers, the
surface is strikingly heterogeneous when viewed from orbit. Still,
there is no evidence that any of the heterogeneities represent oases
that possess characteristics more favorable to terrestrial life than
those already enumerated. One dramatic class of heterogeneities, for
example, is the huge channels that were almost certainly formed by
flowing liquid water. But these channels are too old (probably _ 109
years) to have much bearing on their current suitability for the
growth of terrestrial organisms, except that they might possibly con-
tain concentrated deposits of electrolytes and organic compounds.
The orbital infrared temperature and water-vapor measurements
also show heterogeneities, but again none of those detected have
properties significantly more favorable to terrestrial life than do the
larger-scale features. The resolving power of the IRTM is 0.3 °, which
translates to 8 km at the normal periapsis of 1500 km and 1.6 km for
the now lowered periapsis of Orbiter I (300 km). Smaller oases with
respect to some of the biologically relevant factors are conceivable
(e.g., higher temperatures on south-facing slopes in the northern
hemisphere; higher temperatures because of heat absorbed by dark
objects). It is difficult, however, to conceive of any oasis on the
surface of subpolar regions that would be accessible to terrestrial
organisms and yet not contain the atmospherically induced oxidants.
As mentioned, the subrock sample at VL-2 indicates that some of the
oxidants can diffuse in the regolith.
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Appendix B
Minimum Temperature for
Terrestrial Microbial Growth
The most thorough review known to us of the minimum growth
temperatures of terrestrial microorganisms is that of Michener and
Elliott.l s A histogram summarizing their findings on reports of
growth below 0°C is shown in Figure B.1. Many of these reports are
based on incubation times of over a year. We separate bacteria from
fungi because the latter are nearly all aerobic and would be incapable
of growing at Martian partial pressures of oxygen. The single case of
a bacterium growing below -12°C was a report of growth at-20°C.
Neither it nor the three reports of fungal growth below -12°C have
been confirmed. Michener and Elliott point out that "The best evi-
dence that growth does not generally occur in foods in this tempera-
ture range [i.e., <-17°C] is that billions of cartons of frozen food
have been stored at or near -18°C without reported microbial spoil-
age."
A more recent study by Fennema et al. __ confirms Michener and
Elliott's conclusion that microbial growth in foods does not occur at
-18°C.
This inability of organisms to grow below about -15°C is con-
sistent with the known physical state of aqueous solutions at these
temperatures. As Table B.1 shows, when solutions of sodium chlor-
ide in water, for example, are equilibrated at various subzero temper-
atures, the concentrations in the unfrozen portions exceed 4 molal
below - 15°C. For solutes in general, the concentrations of solutes in
the unfrozen portions of solutions are given by Cure = A T/I.86
where _ is the osmotic coefficient, v the number of species into
which the solute dissociates, and m is the molality. _7 Aside from the
toxic effects to nearly all microorganisms of such high concentra-
tions of electrolytes, the high concentrations also depress the water
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Reference 15.)
Reported cases of microbial growth below 0°C. (Adapted from
TABLE B. 1 Solute Concentrations and Water Activities in NaC1 Solutions at
Various Temperatures
Temperature Concentration NaC1 a
(°C) (molal) aw b
-5 1.45 0.95
-10 2.79 0.91
-14 3.73 O.87
-15 3.96 0.86
-16 4.17 0.85
-18 4.58 0.84
-20 5.00 0.82
_From Reference 19
-- "
aw - PH20 (solution)/PH20 (liquid, pure)
=-Pice/PH20 (liquid pure).
Calculated from data in Reference 20. See Figure B.2.
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FIGURE B.2 Water activity aw = Pice/PH2 0 of a solution in equilibrium with
ice as a function of temperature,
activity (aw) below the value permitting the growth even at optimal
temperatures of all microorganisms save halophilic and osmophilic
forms. As shown in Table B-1 and Figure B-2, the values of aw at
-14, -16, -18, and -20°C are 0.87, 0.85, 0.84, and 0.82, respec-
tively.
EAdditional Related Information
103
104
0
e_
O
_3
@
*,,,4
d
(-,
@
_3
_3
@
c3
_3
i __ _"
E
• _
_]r.. _._.o
.._ _g_ _._ .
_ _.___
u
__._
.s
t_
.8
.,_
_'_
105
106 APPEND1X E
NASA MANAGEMENT INSTRUCTION
NMI 8020.7B
April 17, 1991 NMI 8020.7B
NASA NMI 8020.7B
Management Effective Date: APril 17, 1991
Instruction Expiration Date: APril 17. 1995
RESPONSIBLE OFFICE: S/Office of Space Science and Applications
SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL CONTAMINATION CONTROL FOR OUTBOUND AND
INBOUND PLANETARY SPACECRAFT
I.
This revised Instruction establishes NASA policy and assigns
responsibility for preserving solar system conditions for
future biological and organic constituent exploration and
for protecting the Earth and its biosphere from planetary
and other extraterrestrial sources of contamination.
2. SCOPE AND APPLICABILITY
a. This Instruction applies to NASA Headquarters and Field
Installations.
b. The provisions of this Instruction cover all space
flight missions which may intentionally or
unintentionally carry Earth organisms and organic
constituents to the planets or other solar system
bodies; and any mission employing spacecraft which
are intended to return to Earth and/or its
biosphere from a planet-target of exploration.
3. POLICY
The conduct of scientific investigations of possible
extraterrestrial life forms, precursors, and remnants must
not be jeopardized. In addition, the Earth must be
protected from the potential hazard posed by
extraterrestrial matter carried by a spacecraft returning
from another planet. Therefore, for certain space-
mission/target-planet combinations, controls on organic and
biological contamination carried by spacecraft shall be
imposed, in accordance with issuances implementing this
policy.
*4. MISSION CONSTRAINTS
Specific constraints imposed on spacecraft involved in solar
system exploration will depend on the nature of the mission
*Changed by this revision
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5,
and the identity of the target body or bodies. These
constraints will take into account current scientific
knowledge about the target bodies through recommendations
from both internal and external advisory groups, but most
notably from the Space Studies Board of the National Academy
of Sciences. The most likely constraints on missions of
concern will be a requirement to reduce the biological
contamination of the spacecraft, coupled with constraints on
constituents of the spacecraft and organic samples, and
restrictions on the handiing and methods by which
extraterrestrial samples are returned to Earth. In the
majority of missions, there will also be a requirement to
document spacecraft flyby operations, impact potential, and
the location of landings or impact points of spacecraft on
planetary surfaces or other bodies. The nature and
applicability of mission constraints required by this policy
will be promulgated in subordinate NASA Management
Instructions.
RESPONSIBILITIES
a. The Associate Administrator for Space Science and
Applications is responsible for overall administration
of NASA planetary protection policy. The management of
the policy is delegated to the Planetary Protection
officer in the Life Sciences Division, who is
responsible for:
(i) Prescribing regulations, standards, procedures,
and guidelines applicable to all NASA
organizations, programs, and activities to achieve
the policy objectives prescribed in this
Instruction.
(2) Certifying to the Associate Administrator for
Space Science and Applications and the
Administrator: prior to launch, and in the case of
returning spacecraft, prior to the return phase of
the mission, prior to Earth entry, and again prior
to approved release of returned materials, that:
(i) all measures have been taken to assure
meeting NASA policy objectives as
established in this Instruction and all
lower-tier implementing directives;
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*b.
C.
(ii) the recommendations of the applicable
regulatory agencies with respect to
planetary protection have been considered
and their statutory requirements have been
fulfilled; and
(iii) the international obligations assessed by
the General Counsel and the International
Relations Division have been met, and
international implications have been
considered.
(3) Conducting reviews, inspections, and evaluations
of plans, facilities, equipment, personnel,
procedures, and practices of NASA organizational
elements and NASA contractors to discharge the
requirements of this Instruction.
(4) Taking actions as necessary to achieve conformance
with applicable policies, regulations, and
procedures.
The Associate Administrator for Space Flight and the
Associate Administrator for Space Operations will
ensure that applicable standards and procedures
established under this policy are incorporated into
manned space flight missions to the maximum extent
possible. Any exceptions will be requested and
justified to the Administrator through the Office of
Space Science and Applications.
Program Directors, through the Directors of Field
Installations, are responsible for:
(I) Meeting the biological and organic contamination
control requirements of this Instruction and other
applicable policies, regulations, and procedures
during the conduct of research, development, test,
and preflight operational activities; and
(2) Providing for the conduct of reviews, inspections,
and evaluations by the Office of Space Science and
Applications pursuant to this Instruction.
*Changed by this revision.
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6. IMPLEMENTATION
The Associate Administrator for Space Science and
Applications will assure implementation of this Instruction
by:
a, Maintaining the required activities in support of the
planetary protection policy at NASA Headquarters.
b. Assuring that the research and technology required to
implement the planetary protection policy is conducted.
C. Monitoring space flight missions as necessary to meet
the requirements for certification.
7. CANCELLATION
NMI 8020.7A dated May 4, 1988.
DISTRIBUTION:
SDL 1
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HISTORY AND BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE VIKING
CLEANING AND STERILIZING PROCEDURES
Throughout this document, the task group has referred to Viking levels
of cleanliness and sterilization as representing a reasonable standard for
future Mars missions. It has distinguished between the preparations that
may be needed for unpiloted missions that carry no in situ, extant life-
detection experiments, and those that will follow later and will carry such
life-detection experiments. For the former, the task group has proposed that
Viking-level cleanliness will be sufficient, with the caveat that more exten-
sive bioburden assays should be included, incorporating modern techniques
as they are adapted for the assay of spacecraft. For missions that include
extant life-detection experiments, the task group has recommended use of
the Viking sterilization program, or one equally effective in removing bioburden
and contaminants. Briefly described below are the very detailed, compre-
hensive protocols used on Viking, along with some of the scientific and
historical rationale underlying these procedures.
The Viking mission was conceived and designed in general in the late
1960s and launched in 1975. It successfully landed two fairly sophisticated
spacecraft on Mars (with an orbiter for each), both of which performed
almost perfectly and produced an enormous amount of data, far beyond that
specified, over a period of up to 3 years, depending on the experiment.
The spacecraft, which were identical, emphasized the search for life on
Mars and contained three different experiments, each designed specifically
to look for evidence of indigenous, extant biological activity in the surface
material. In addition, there was a pyrolysis gas chromatograph-mass spec-
trometer (GC-MS) designed to search for organic matter in the samples.
The remainder of the payload included instrumentation for atmospheric analyses,
collection of data on climatology and seismic activity, and preliminary geochemi-
cal analyses; a sample acquisition system; and cameras.
It was clear that the life-detection experiments and the GC-MS were all
extremely susceptible to contamination (both biological and chemical) from
terrestrial sources and absolutely needed to be protected from contami-
nants that would yield false-positive data. tt seemed pointless to go to Mars
to detect terrestrial bacteria or terrestrial hydrocarbons that were carried
there on a contaminated spacecraft. This problem was recognized in the
early stages of planning for lunar and planetary exploration, and a planetary
quarantine office was established at NASA Headquarters in the early 1960s.
This operation included a planetary quarantine officer (a career Public Health
officer) and an operating budget for the development of a research program
aimed at establishing the necessary technology to prevent planetary con-
tamination. Help was solicited from a wide spectrum of expertise in the
country such as the U.S. Public Health Service, the Center for Disease
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Control, the Department of Agriculture, the food canning industry, and oth-
ers, and an interagency committee was established to oversee NASA's ac-
tivities. At the same time the cooperation of the international community
was solicited through the Committee on Space Research (COSPAR), and an
international agreement to prevent contamination was produced. The former
Soviets are party to this agreement, and although we have never seen their
protocols for spacecraft cleaning and sterilization, their officials have as-
sured us that their Mars probes were sterilized.
During the 1960s, a great deal of research was done in universities and in
government laboratories to find methods for cleaning and, if necessary,
sterilizing spacecraft. Research was done in the area of survivability of
microorganisms under extremely adverse conditions, including simulated
martian environments. Expert advisory committees were assembled, and
guidelines were developed that led to the formulation of the Viking clean-
ing and sterilization protocols. Many techniques were studied, evaluated,
and rejected or accepted. These included most of the contemporary meth-
ods for sterilizing found in the biology laboratory, in hospitals, and in the
food (particularly canning) industry, as well as techniques for the control of
disease. Since large structures, such as spacecraft, had never been sterilized
before, many of the seemingly simple questions took on unusual complexi-
ties. These problems were compounded by the need to sterilize materials
and components that had never undergone such treatment and would very
likely be sensitive to it. This necessitated an extensive heat-testing program
and the replacement of some standard spacecraft parts with new materials.
Although this was a costly undertaking, there is reason to believe that it led
to a family of new and more reliable materials for the spacecraft industry.
Sterilization techniques such as gaseous sterilization with "fumigants"
such as ethylene oxide were rejected because of the corrosive and poten-
tially explosive nature of the gases. Spacecraft irradiation was rejected
because of the sensitivity of many spacecraft components and scientific
instruments to irradiation, and because of the great difficulty in implement-
ing such a technique. Furthermore, it had been determined that surface
sterilization was inadequate because viable organisms were found in the
interiors of components and materials (including plastics) and in cracks and
crevices not reached by gases. It was reasoned that such organisms could
be released by the impact of landing, thus providing a source of contamina-
tion for the surface to be sampled. The biology instrumentation was the
system most sensitive to contamination and was the driver in the develop-
ment of sterilization techniques. Surface samples were to be acquired by a
sampling arm, transported to a sample-processing system where they could
be sifted and sized, and then moved into whatever instrument was sched-
uled to receive them. These instruments included the three life-detection
instruments, the GC-MS, and the inorganic analytical instrument. Since
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there was no realistic way to totally isolate the life-detection instruments,
there was no way to sterilize only those instruments, and so the entire
spacecraft had to be sterilized.
Heat sterilization proved to be the most satisfactory method available for
use. Two methods were considered: wet heat (autoclaving) and dry heat.
Since wet heat was too destructive (particularly for electronic components),
dry heat was ultimately used. Briefly, after assembly and testing, the Vi-
king spacecraft was disassembled and treated as follows:
I. Surfaces were rigorously cleaned to reduce the starting bioburden on
the spacecraft, thus reducing the time required for sterilization at high tem-
perature.
2. Instruments were cleaned and assembled in cleanrooms by workers in
surgical attire; laminar flow hoods were used, and the rooms had appropri-
ate filters to remove virtually all microorganisms from the air. Both the
lander and orbiter were treated in this way.
3. The entire lander and its payload were assembled under the same
conditions. The lander was packaged inside a sealed "bioshield" that pre-
vented recontamination between the period of time from assembly and sub-
sequent sterilization, through launch, until departure from Earth's atmo-
sphere.
4. The lander was then placed in an oven and subjected to dry heat in
cycles. In order to assure that the interior of the spacecraft reached suffi-
cient temperature for sterilization, a liquid was pumped to the interior. The
precise heating cycle was indicated by the calculated bioburden on the lander
as determined by surface sampling with standard laboratory techniques (cotton
swabbing, culturing, and microbial colony counting). The temperatures
used and the duration of the heat application were calculated to be suffi-
cient to sterilize the entire lander and all of its parts.
The success of this rather cumbersome procedure is found in the success
of the mission: no instruments failed. The lander worked perfectly, and no
problems were induced by sterilization. The biology instruments and the
GC-MS were not contaminated in any detectable way. Although the proce-
dure certainly had an impact on the cost of the mission (it has been esti-
mated at between 5 and 15 percent of the total cost), perhaps the financial
aspect was not too serious considering that the scientific potential was pre-
served. In addition, a catalog of highly resistant and reliable materials and
components was produced, which should greatly simplify dealing with the
problem of cleaning spacecraft for future missions, as well as substantially
reduce future costs.
It is likely that other existing techniques appropriate to future missions
may be simpler to implement and more effective. Viking sterilization pro-
tocols were settled on in the early 1970s and based on technology devel-
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oped in the 1960s and earlier. An appropriate, properly funded research
program could greatly enhance the prospect of simplifying procedures and
reducing costs. This task group urges NASA to proceed with such a pro-
gram.
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